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ABSTRACT 
 
 
DUELING DEVELOPMENT MODELS: JAPAN’S CHALLENGE TO THE 
WASHINGTON CONSENSUS IN THE 1990S 
 
Rie Taniguchi 
Advisor: Sarah Babb 
 
 
In the early 1990s, at the height of the Washington Consensus, its hegemonic 
model of neoliberal development was strongly challenged by Japan, the U.S.’s greatest 
ally. The key event characterizing this challenge occurred when Japan’s Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) began criticizing the World Bank’s famous 
Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs). This subsequently led to the publication of the 
“East Asian Miracle Report” by the World Bank financed by the Japanese government. 
This poses a great puzzle considering Japan’s historically submissive and politically 
deferential relationship with the U.S. since the end of World War II. I address two 
questions in my thesis to solve the above puzzle: (1) why did the Japanese state choose to 
oppose American ideological hegemony in the 1990s? (2) how did the ideas involved in 
this challenge develop within and beyond the institution of Japanese policy bureaucracy?  
The theory and methods used in this paper are inspired by the historical 
institutionalist tradition in sociology and political science. I argue that the shift in Japan’s 
foreign aid strategy in the late 1980s was driven by a mixture of economic, institutional 
and political factors. This along with the escalating influence of the Washington 
Consensus and its interference with Japanese aid policy, drove Japan to oppose American 
ideological hegemony in the 1990s. Furthermore, tracing the policy discourses of the 
OECF during this period revealed that not only economic and political factors, but also 
 
 
the developmentalist idea that valued the central role of the state in its economic 
development was essential in instigating Japan’s construction and promotion of its own 
development model. I conclude that Japan’s challenge was both a local and a global 
social construct, developed in the processes of transnational interaction with other states 
and their actors, and drawing on internationally available economic ideas. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Between the 1980s and early 2000s, countries around the world were strongly 
encouraged to adopt the neoliberal model of economic development—the so-called 
“Washington Consensus”—which was largely characterized by freeing markets and 
diminishing the role of the state1. The Washington Consensus was heavily endorsed by 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) backed by the United States treasury (Babb 2009). However, in the 
early 1990s, at the height of the Washington Consensus, its hegemonic model of 
neoliberal development was strongly challenged by Japan, the greatest ally of the U.S.  
Japan became the first advanced industrialized country to explicitly defy the ideological 
premises of the Washington Consensus and question the efficiency of its economic model.  
The key event characterizing Japan’s dramatic but gradual questioning of the 
institutional legitimacy of the Washington Consensus happened in the early 1990s when 
Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF),2 which handled Japan’s overseas 
development loans, began criticizing the World Bank’s famous Structural Adjustment 
Loans (SALs) and its neoliberal prescriptions. The World Bank’s subsequent publication 
of the “East Asian Miracle Report” orchestrated and financed by the Japanese 
government can be seen as the pinnacle of Japan’s ideological challenge (Rodrik 1994; 
Terry 1995; Wade 1996; Terry 2002; Taniguchi and Babb 2009). The event demonstrates 
                                               
1 The term “Washington Consensus” was coined by John Williamson, an economist at the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington DC. He summarized the term with 10 policy recommendations that 
were commonly promoted by Washington-based financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank and 
the U.S. treasury department at that time. Some of the key recommendations included trade liberalization, 
privatization of state enterprises and deregulation.         
2 The OECF was established in 1961 as a quasigovernmental organization responsible for managing 
Japanese loan aid in developing countries. 
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a great puzzle considering Japan’s historically submissive and politically deferential 
relationship with the U.S. since the end of World War II. How can we explain such an 
apparent anomaly?  
In my quest to solve the above puzzle, the two primary questions that I address in 
my thesis are: (1) why did the Japanese state choose to oppose American ideological 
hegemony in the 1990s? (2) how did the ideas involved in this challenge develop within 
and beyond the institution of Japanese policy bureaucracy?  
The theory and methods used in this paper are inspired by the historical 
institutionalist tradition in sociology and political science (Heclo 1974; Katzenstein 1978; 
Skocpol 1985; Weir and Skocpol 1985; Hall 1992; Immergut 1992; King 1992; Weir 
1992; Blyth 2002; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Steinmo 2008). The historical 
institutionalist approach demonstrates that social institutions—particularly a state’s 
organizational structures, its policy legacies and existing policy arrangements—matter 
because they influence the state’s policy making at large. Within this view, private 
interests and political groups have some powerful influence over policy making; however, 
they are not the sole producers of a state’s policy. A state is considered an autonomous 
entity which holds an independent capacity over its policy making. The historical 
institutionalist approach uniquely highlights the impacts of historical circumstances and 
the role of ideas on a state’s policy making.   
In addition to the above approach, I will draw on theories from the new 
institutionalist tradition in organizational sociology which theorizes how organizations 
within a field, such as national governments, are structured by forces in their 
environments (Meyer, Boli and Thomas 1994; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer et al. 1997; 
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Meyer 2000; Boli 2006).  In what follows, I will first describe the historical background 
of Japan’s political economy followed by a review of the relevant theoretical literatures 
that inform my research.  
 
THE HISTORY OF JAPANESE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
After its victory in World War II, the U.S government played an enormous role in 
shaping Japanese policy models in many different areas. Some of these influences were 
direct and others more indirect. 
 
I.  Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations in the U.S. Occupation Era (1945-1950)  
 
After the wartime destruction, the Japanese economy occupied only a tiny place 
in the world. It was generally conceived of as an economy closely associated with, 
and often subordinate to, the U.S. economy. The favorite phrase was, When the 
United States sneezes, Japan catches pneumonia. Japan was completely under U.S. 
hegemony in the economic as well as the political sense (Hamada and Patrick 
1988:110).  
 
The U.S. occupation of Japan began in 1945 following the end of World War II. 
The occupation policies were framed around two primary goals—“demilitarization” and 
“democratization”—to restructure the Japanese economy, polity and society as a whole.  
Demilitarization policies included demolishing zaibatsu structures3 and purging wartime 
economic elites along with a number of strict regulations and restrictions on economic 
activities. Democratization measures included constitutional reforms along with the 
implementation of new policies such as agricultural land reforms and institutionalization 
                                               
3  Japanese Zaibatsu refers to industrial and financial business conglomerates that emerged during the late 
19th and early 20th century (the Meiji period) and held dominant power until the end of WWII. Under 
Zaibatsu structure, a few families controlled a significant part of Japanese economy and finance.  
 
 
 
4 
of labor rights. Most of the fundamental principles for Japan’s early postwar reforms 
were crafted in Washington (Nakamura 1993; Kobayashi et al. 1995).  
 Fearing the spread of Communism throughout Asia, the U.S. dramatically shifted 
its policies toward Japan to stabilize Japan’s economy in order to halt the spread of the 
Communist bloc. In 1948, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) passed a resolution 
that lifted most of the economic restrictions on Japan in order to promote the state’s rapid 
economic recovery. In this context, U.S.-led General Head Quarters (GHQ) introduced 
the controversial “Dodge Line” on March 7, 1949. This was named after the new 
economic advisor to GHQ, Joseph Dodge, who had been the president of the Detroit 
Bank. The Dodge Line consisted of severe monetary and financial contractionary policies 
to reduce the size of Japan’s domestic money supply to deal with extreme postwar 
inflation (Hadley 1989:297-299; Nakamura 1993; Takagi et al. 1994; Dower 1999:540). 
Primary measures included balancing the national budget to reduce inflation, dissolving 
the Reconstruction Finance Bank4 to eliminate its uneconomical loans and postwar 
subsidies, and fixing the exchange rate (at 1dollar =360 yen) to make its exports 
competitive internationally. The Dodge Line lasted for three and a half years. Initially, 
Japanese economic bureaucrats had hoped to adopt these austerity measures gradually, 
but the GHQ demanded their immediate implementation. The quick adaptation of these 
drastic policies led to severe deflation and economic chaos as many of the domestic 
industries and private banks were pushed to the brink of bankruptcy. Japan’s Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of Japan aggressively purchased credit from private financial 
                                               
4 The Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) was created by the Japanese government in 1947 to try to pull 
itself out of the massive postwar economic collapse and to restore economic production to a prewar level. 
According to Johnson (1982:179), “SCAP [the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers] derided these 
institutions as perpetuations of the old cozy relationship between government and business.”    
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institutions while vigorously providing government lending in order to rescue these banks 
from bankruptcy and prevent the whole economy from falling into depression (Nakamura 
1993:155; Takagi et al. 1994:13; Dower 1999:540-545). This “over-lending” scheme by 
the central bureaucracies strengthened the central authority’s influence over the banks 
and reestablished intimate ties between industries and financial institutions in Japan5. 
Scholars further suggest that some of the important characteristics of the postwar 
Japanese economy were shaped while Japan was struggling to negotiate its economy 
under the Dodge Line (Nakamura 1993:155; Kobayashi et al. 1995:207 and 226-228; 
Dower 1999:544-545). Lastly, working under Dodge’s plan represented a critical moment 
in which Japanese and American conservative politicians and businesses formed a 
structure of alliance and a bond that lasted for decades. According to Theodore Cohen 
quoted in Hadley (1989:298), Dodge “more than any other individual, engineered the 
historic tacit alliance between American and Japanese conservatives and business 
elements that endured for the decades that followed.”   
 With the boost in war procurements, the beginning of the Korean War on June 25, 
1950 brought an end to Japan’s deflation under the Dodge Line. Between 1949 and 1951, 
Japan’s exports almost tripled and production increased by 70 percent. U.S. “special 
procurement”— foreign currency inflow associated with American military spending—
played a significant role in increasing Japan’s total exports6 (Nakamura 1993; Kobayashi 
et al. 1995:148-150; Dower 1999: 541-542). By 1951, imports had doubled which 
allowed Japan to increase its capacity for further economic production (Nakamura 
                                               
5 I will discuss this in more detail in section II. 
6 According to Dower (1999:542), special procurements brought approximately 2.3 billion dollars into 
Japan between 1950 and 1953. This exceeded the total amount of aid received from the U.S. between 1945 
and 1951. 
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1993:157). Between 1949 and 1952, several key institutional developments pushed 
Japan’s economic recovery forward. In May 1949, the Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI) was created to promote international trade, commerce and Japan’s 
industrial development. Between 1950 and 1952, the Development Bank of Japan (JDB) 
and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) were also established in order to allocate 
low interest loans and investments to domestic industries as well as to promote exports 
(Nakamura 1993:159; Kobayashi et al. 1995:151). Noguchi (1995a) demonstrated how 
these government financial institutions and their creative schemes of long-term lending 
and fiscal investment supported by high saving in the private sector played a strategic 
role in the early phrases of Japanese economic growth especially in the 1950s.  
 Finally, and most importantly, the San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and 
the United States and its allies was signed in September 1951 and effectively ended the 
U.S. occupation of Japan in April 1952. In addition to various social and political 
institutional reforms, the Japanese government began to reshape the economic institutions 
and regulations that had been introduced by GHQ; for example, it relaxed the anti-
monopoly law in 1953. These changes also had a great impact on the development of the 
Japanese economy in the following decades (Nakamura 1993:161).    
 
II. The High Growth Era from the 1950s to the Early 1970s.   
 Japan’s high growth era began in the 1950s and lasted until the beginning of the 
1970s. This period is often characterized as the decades of the “Japanese Miracle” during 
which Japan experienced steady economic growth by an average of 10 percent 
(Nakamura 1993:163). One of the primary factors that caused Japanese growth was the 
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stable currency environment put in place by the international monetary regime. The 
Bretton Woods system of the dollar standard and fixed exchange rate7 helped Japan 
achieve steady economic growth through exports and a continuous inflow of dollars. At 
the same time, Keynesian policies of full employment, which spread throughout the 
world, increased demand for Japanese exports. Japan maintained the exchange rate of 1 
dollar=360 yen for 22 years until 1971 when the U.S. abandoned the dollar standard. As a 
result, this ended the fixed exchange system by the Bretton Woods (Hamada and Patrick 
1988; Nakamura 1993:168-170). The Japanese government announced its first national 
economic plan in 1955 when Japan also joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). The 1955 plan particularly addressed Japan’s need for economic 
independence from the U.S. (transforming its economy from a special procurements- 
driven one to a self-sustainable one), full-time employment and steady growth 
accompanied by expansion of exports and trade. Policy makers began constructing a 
roadmap for Japan’s economic growth, which at the same time, instigated and 
strengthened the public sentiments to create “modern industries” and the desire to “catch 
up with the West” (Komiya and Itoh 1988:175-176; Yamamura 1995:111-113).  
 The 1960s brought a number of big events and challenges to the Japanese state. 
1968 was the “epoch making year” when Japan's GNP became the second largest in the 
world surpassing West Germany (Hamada 1996). In February 1963, Japan joined the 
Article 11 countries in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In the 
following year, Japan became the first non-Western country to join The Organization for 
                                               
7 The Bretton Woods system was created in 1944 and made the dollar the international standard currency 
by linking the U.S. dollar to gold. Countries agreed to fix their exchange rate by tying their currencies to 
the U.S. dollar. This was monitored by newly established International Monetary Fund (IMF) (See Hamada 
and Patrick 1988). 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and became an Article 8 country in 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF)8. All these transitions meant that Japan was 
finally welcomed back to the international community and was now expected to play a 
more active role in international economic governance and take more responsibility as an 
“advanced industrial nation” in addressing North-South gap. In 1966, the Asian 
Development Bank was established with Japan’s leadership. 
 
III. The Breakdown of the International Monetary Regime and Development of U.S.-
Japan Trade Conflicts.  
 
 The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rate ended in August 1971 when 
President Nixon announced his New Economic Policy, which severed the weakening link 
between the dollar and gold. According to Hamada, Nixon’s new policy was especially 
(although not exclusively) targeted towards Japan, which was becoming a growing 
exporter of manufactured goods to the U.S. (Hamada and Patrick 1988). This event 
marked the official end of the era of high growth, which had been greatly sustained by 
the fixed exchange rate of 1 dollar = 360 yen. The end of the Bretton Woods system 
meant a volatile exchange rate, decrease of exports, rapid inflation accompanied by a 
hike in domestic property values and goods prices along with worsening government debt. 
Finally, in 1973, the Japanese government adopted anti-inflation policies which marked 
the official end to the high growth era that had lasted for more than 20 years (Nakamura 
1993:215-225). 
                                               
8 These memberships required Japan to abandon various economic privileges enjoyed as a poor war-
recovering nation since 1945 (e.g. Japan was no longer able to restrict imports due to the international trade 
balance). 
 
 
 
9 
  This also meant that Japan finally graduated from American economic support 
and protection. The U.S. could no longer afford to treat Japan paternalistically due to 
growing problems and the decline of the U.S. economy accompanied in 1971, by its first 
global trade deficit in 78 years (Higashi and Lauter 1987:26). Trade disagreements 
between Japan and the U.S. began to emerge. Japan’s role as a rising global competitor 
led to frequent and often long-lasting trade conflicts that threatened the relationship 
between the two countries from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. Structural differences 
between the two economies also aggravated these conflicts. Higashi and Lauter (1987:29) 
observed the ambivalent state of the Japanese polity during this period.  
Gradually emerging economic power and its aggressive international trade 
competitiveness contrasted the self-effacing and passive behavior exhibited by 
Japanese representatives in the international arena. The “little brother” attitude of 
military, political, and economic dependency toward the United States, the wait-
and-see approach marked by defensiveness in international negotiations in general 
and in the trade conflict with America in particular, was a reflection of the 
unresolved clash between long-held self-perceptions and the sudden economic 
reality.  
 
 Moreover, cultural and normative differences among policy makers from the both 
sides further complicated the issue (Higashi and Lauter 1987:30-31). Japanese policy 
makers’ limited international orientation and communication skills (e.g. language 
barriers) also made it difficult for both parties to reach consensus. Finally, political 
scientists such as Katzenstein (1978:7) keenly observed that trade conflicts were the 
result of “redistribution of economic power” among the advanced industrial countries, 
and this challenged the long history of U.S.-led international political and monetary 
system established since the end of World War II. Moreover, Japan’s non-tariff barriers 
such as testing procedures and government procurement made it very difficult for the U.S. 
and other competitors to intervene in Japan’s domestic market by holding back their 
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imports. Clearly, Japan’s record high trade surplus accompanied by the U.S.’s record 
high trade deficit with Japan, further aggravated the political and economic relationship 
between the two states.   
 U.S. pressure to open up the Japanese economy reached a peak in the 1980s 
during the presidency of Ronald Regan. Under the severe influence of “Reaganomics” 
and U.S. domestic political pressures caused by rising unemployment (e.g. auto-
industries) accompanied by high inflation, the U.S. condemned the closed nature of 
Japanese domestic economy, especially its rigid financial regulation. According to 
Higashi and Lauter (1988:156),  
U.S. pressure for reform was based on the belief that Japanese financial 
regulations had driven down the value of the yen by making it an unattractive 
currency. U.S. officials argued that freer capital markets would increase 
international use of the yen, thereby raising its value and also moderating some 
trade problems. Moreover, American financial firms wanted greater access to 
Japanese capital markets, and complained that Japanese regulations hindered them 
from playing a larger role in competing for institutional and private investments, 
particularly the lucrative pension funds.  
 
Such contexts gradually made Japanese policy makers succumb to U.S. demands to 
liberalize its financial market structure (Nakamura 1993:245).  
 Between 1981 and 1984, the Japanese government adopted various market-
opening measures that included further tariff reductions (Higashi and Lauter 1987:52-53; 
Mabuchi 1993; Muramatsu 1993). On November 1983, a Yen-Dollar accord was signed 
between the U.S. treasury and Japan’s Ministry of Finance (MOF) which included a set 
of measures such as (1) liberalization of capital flows, (2) internationalization of the yen, 
(3) increased foreign participation, and (4) deregulation of domestic capital markets 
(Higashi and Lauter 1987:156-157). Finally, in 1984, the MOF published an official 
document titled “The Current Status and Future Prospects for the Liberalization of 
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Financial and Capital Markets, and the Internationalization of the Yen” (MOF 1984; 
Nakamura 1993:246). The report argued that internationalization of yen represented 
“unavoidable steps” for the progress of the Japanese economy, and in order to 
internationalize the yen, financial liberalization of domestic institutions and the capital 
market was essential (MOF 1984:2). Trade frictions and the U.S. pressure to deregulate 
the Japanese economy also began to threaten the power of economic bureaucracies 
particularly the MOF during this period (Mabuchi 1995).  
 Finally, the Plaza agreement was signed on September, 1985 among financial 
ministers of the group of five (France, West Germany, Japan and the U.S., and the U.K.), 
which unexpectedly announced a currency intervention to depreciate the U.S. dollar 
against the yen and the German mark. As a result, the value of dollar dropped by almost 
40 percent between September 1985 and September 1986 (Hamada and Patrick 
1988:122-126; Nakamura 1993:253). Some scholars argued that Plaza agreement and 
sudden devaluation of the dollar against the yen was one of the fundamental causes of the 
crisis and deep recession of the Japanese economy in the subsequent years, i.e. the 
“bursting of the bubble” and Heisei recession that lasted for more than a decade (Iida and 
Mizutani 1995; Brenner 1998).  
 
JAPANESE POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTALISM AND THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC 
POLICY BUREAUCRACY 
 
Many scholars argue that Japan’s extraordinary economic progress in the postwar 
era was driven by its developmentalist ideology promoted by Japan’s bureaucratic elites 
(Johnson 1982; Gao 1997). Japan’s developmentalist ideology is composed of several 
key beliefs that characterize its core values and policy orientation. First, it believes that 
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fulfilling the country’s economic development is a top priority and the prime 
responsibility of the state and its bureaucracy. Second, to realize the above goal, the state 
must play a leading role in prioritizing and promoting economic development within the 
framework of a capitalist market economy. Third, the state should serve as an architect of 
national economic development by guiding the nation’s long-term economic 
development through implementing industrial policy (e.g. the government does not only 
maintain macroeconomic stability but also needs to direct scarce resources to productive 
investment sectors). According to Johnson (1982), the collaborative strategy between the 
state and private sector was one of the most important and unique parts of Japanese 
industrial policy particularly during the high-growth era. The main mechanisms of this 
cooperative form of government-business relationship were:               
selective access to governmental or government-guaranteed financing, targeted 
tax breaks, government-supervised investment coordination in order to keep all 
participants profitable, the equitable allocation by the state of burdens during 
times of adversity (something the private cartel finds it very hard to do), 
governmental assistance in the commercialization and sale of products, and 
governmental assistance when an industry as a whole begins to decline (Johnson 
1982:311).  
 
Key ministries that promoted the industrial policy were the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI)9 and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). They also 
gave birth to important financial institutions such as the Development Bank of Japan (the 
JDB established in March 1951) and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (the JEXIM 
established in December 1950) that became the central instruments of Japan’s postwar 
industrial policy (Johnson 1982). Generally bureaucrats from the both ministries shared 
the above-mentioned ideology of Japan’s long-term economic development. They 
                                               
9 MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) was reorganized into the METI (the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry) in 2001. 
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performed distinct but sometimes overlapping institutional tasks to realize such national 
economic goals. For example, the MOF supervised overall national finance and thus 
regulated interest rates in various submarkets of the capital market. Another important 
function of the MOF was to control foreign parties operating in Japan. According to 
Mabuchi (1995:292), 
During the high growth era, financial officials tightly controlled the flow of 
foreign and domestic capital to and from Japan, by using the Foreign Exchange 
Law in order to maintain Japan’s international balance of payments at a given 
level. It was necessary to insulate the Japanese capital market from influences of 
foreign capital in order for domestic regulations to function effectively. If the 
inflow and outflow of capital were not regulated, the domestic system of 
regulated interest rates could be easily circumvented, thereby undermining the 
system [of industrial policy]. 
 
Overall, the MOF played a key role in creating the broader domestic financial 
environment that best promoted Japanese industrial policy.    
One of the most important financial instruments created by the MOF to support 
the country’s industrial policy was a government-run financing scheme called the Fiscal 
Investment and Loan Program (FILP). FILP was often referred as “the second budget” 
and provided ample financing to important government affiliated institutions such as the 
JDP and JEXIM (Noguchi 1995b:261)10 According to Noguchi (1995b) and Johnson 
(1982), FILP provided the Japanese government great financial flexibility, particularly 
considerable freedom of action in policy making due to the fact that it was out of Diet’s 
control until 1973. This budget was constructed annually by the bureaucrats from the 
Ministry of Finance and the Industrial Capital Section of MITI’s Enterprises Bureau. 
                                               
10 The size of the FLIP and it share in GNP were as follows. 1955(297.8 billion dollars/3.4% of GNP), 
1960 (625.1/3.9), 1965(1,776.4/5.3), 1970(3,799.0/5.1), 1975 (10,561.0/6.9), 1980(18,103.6/7.4), 
1985(20,495.0/6.3), 1990(35,815.8/8.2) cited in (Noguchi 1995b:267).   
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According to Johnson (1982:210), “From 1953 on it became the single most important 
financial instrument for Japan’s economic development.”      
With respect to the MITI, its primary role was to design the details of Japan’s 
industrial strategy and to put it into effect by directly working with the nation’s private 
sector. In order to execute this task, it also exercised strong policy-making influence over 
the government’s key financial institutions11 including the JDB and the JEXIM (Johnson 
1982).  For example, the MITI played a dominant role in selecting which industries to 
develop to meet the nation’s economic priorities. It held control over all foreign exchange 
and imports of technology and had the ability to dispense preferential financing, tax 
breaks, and protection from foreign competition to private sectors. The MITI used the 
power of “administrative guidance” (Johnson 1982) and informal and formal sanctions to 
control/guide the actions of private sector particularly during the high growth era12.  
 
THE CHANGING ROLE OF JAPANESE FOREIGN AID 
 
Since the initiation of its foreign aid program in the mid-1960s, Japan had been a 
passive participant in multilateral as well as bilateral foreign aid (Lincoln 1993:109; 
Yasutomo 1993:324). Japan also lacked an explicit philosophy or strategy for foreign aid 
(Kusano 1997:50-51; Shimomura, Nakagawa, and Saito 1999:62-64; Sugishita 2005: 91). 
The primary purpose of aid had been the pragmatic promotion of Japanese private sector 
                                               
11 According to Johnson (1982:209 in footnote), eight government banks existed at the end of 1953: the 
Central Cooperative Bank for Agriculture and Forestry (1926), the Bank for Commerce and Industrial 
Cooperatives (1936), the People’s Finance Corporation (1949), the Housing Loan Corporation (1950), the 
JEXIM (1950) and the JDB (1951).  
12 According to Johnson (1982:224-225), “On February 25, 1952, it [the MITI] informally advised ten big 
cotton spinners to reduce production by 40 percent, and the ministry assigned quotas to each individual 
firm. To enterprises that rejected this ‘administrative guidance,’ MITI mentioned (again verbally and 
informally) that foreign currency allocations for their next month’s supply of raw cotton might not be 
available.” 
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interests13 (Rix 1980; Yasutomo 1986; Yanagihara and Emig 1991:38; Yasutomo 1995; 
Terry 2002; Sugishita 2005:83-84). According to Yasutomo (1995:6), “Under a policy of 
‘separation of politics from economics,’ the political dimension of Japan’s aid was, in 
large part, a concession to the American hegemon, while economic objectives constituted 
Japan’s indigenous national interest.”   
 Beginning in the late 1970s, however, this shifted: Japan started using foreign aid 
as a strategic tool. It greatly expanded its foreign aid to meet a wider range of demands 
and policy goals in the international community. Overall, Japan’s total contributions 
tripled during the 1980s, transforming the country into the largest foreign-aid provider in 
the world, surpassing even the USA in 1989.  Meanwhile, Japan also increased its 
monetary contribution to multilateral development organizations such as the World Bank, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the International Monetary Fund (Yasutomo 
1995:71; Araki 1997b:144). By 1991, Japan had become the second largest donor to 
multilateral aid organizations after Germany (Lincoln 1993:115). The key factors that 
contributed to the rise of Japanese foreign aid were: (1) international pressures, (2) 
economic interests, and (3) the policy bureaucracy’s increased interests in enhancing 
Japan’s global role. This increased interest was supported by Japan’s “new nationalism” 
fueled in part by growing economic tensions with the U.S.    
 First, the end to the fixed dollar-yen exchange rate in 1971, accompanied by the 
Plaza Accord in 1985 produced a sharp rise of the yen14 as well as a growing trade 
surplus, which generated tremendous pressure from Western countries for Japan to 
                                               
13 Through tied-aid, developing countries are required to purchase goods and services from Japan, which 
satisfied the commercial interests of Japanese firms. 
14 The dramatic appreciation of the yen made the total amount of foreign aid greater in value relative to 
other currencies. 
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recycle some of its funds as foreign aid. As the country became richer, Japan was also 
under enormous pressure to increase monetary contributions to international financial 
institutions and to take a greater leadership role in solving the deepening problems of the 
Third World debt crisis. Secondly, financial deregulation in the 1980s as well as the 
heightened value of yen resulted in waves of overseas investments by Japanese 
manufacturing industries. Such circumstance encouraged the government to provide more 
foreign aid as well as loans to Asia to set up favorable infrastructure and investment 
conditions for Japanese industries (Lincoln 1993:110; Söderberg 1996:Ch 3). Thirdly, by 
the mid-1980s, Japanese aid officials became increasingly interested in raising Japan’s 
position and status in the world particularly through increasing its influence in 
international financial institutions, a goal that required increased contributions (Yasutomo 
1995).   
The shift in state-wide policy discourse over Japan’s foreign aid initially appeared 
in the early 1970s following Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s official visits to the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in January 1973. Importantly, the 
normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China took place in September 
1972, following U.S. President Nixon’s visit to China in February 197215. Apart from the 
Philippines, Prime Minister Tanaka encountered student-led anti-Japan demonstrations in 
all the countries he visited. Especially massive demonstrations took place in Bangkok and 
Jakarta, and the latter developed into the society-wide anti-Japan riots (OECF RQ 
1974/16:1; Araki 1997a). According to Lam (2013:11), a number of factors drove these 
anti-Japanese riots.  
                                               
15This was in concordance with the changing reality of geo-politics in the Southeast Asian region brought 
by the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine by U.S. President, Richard Nixon (Araki 1997a:4-5).  
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[T]he Southeast Asian perception that Tokyo was dominating the region 
economically whereas it was doing so militarily three decades before; that 
Japanese management did not promote indigenous talent and unduly relied on 
ethnic Chinese domiciled in Southeast Asia for business deals. Demonstrating 
against Japan was also an indirect way for the protesters to embarrass the ruling 
regimes of Thailand and Indonesia.   
 
The protesters called for a state-wide boycott of all Japanese merchandise and expressed 
strong anger and frustration against Japanese businesses operating in these countries.  
Not surprisingly, these events brought immense shock to the Japanese state and its 
policy leaders (Lancaster 2007:116). Top state officials blamed the “mal-behavior” of 
Japanese business abroad and advocated for the government leadership to promote 
“economic cooperation” in Southeast Asia. At the same time, this event was also a great 
blow to Japanese business communities with rapidly increasing investments in the region 
backed by the MITI16. Soon after his return from the ASEAN visits, Prime Minister 
Tanaka announced the shift from the private sector (business) to the government17 in 
handling economic aid. The early 1970s marked the turning point for the Japanese state 
to rethink and upgrade its geo-political and economic aid strategy in Southeast Asia.  
 Furthermore, the Japanese state’s desire to reconstruct its global self-image 
became increasingly important in this context. By the mid-1980s, Japanese policy makers 
were clearly considering foreign aid, particularly multilateral aid, as the state’s unique 
political tool to elevate Japan’s political position and national prestige (Yasutomo 1995; 
Lancaster 2010:35-36). For example, several scholars pointed to several “symbolic goals” 
                                               
16 By March 1973, 1736 Japanese companies were operating abroad and the total number of their oversea 
offices and factories were 3426. Among them, 1594 offices and factories were located in Asia (Araki 
1997a:95 citing Keidanren’s research). Araki (1997a:96) lists various initiatives taken by the MITI and 
Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations in Japan) in order to better understand this conflict in 
Asia.  
17 Tanaka also expressed a similar view of state’s management of the domestic economy during the first oil 
shock of 1974. Tanaka severely criticized oil companies for raising the price of oil and warned business 
leaders that if the private sectors fail to cooperate with the state (and raised oil prices disproportionately), 
the state would take direct control over its economy (Gao 1997:301).    
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associated with Japan’s dramatic increase in foreign aid during this period. First Japan 
wanted to reestablish the honorable and respected status—which had been shattered by its 
defeat in World War II—in the international community. Secondly, Japan wished to 
construct its self-image as a highly “developed” nation comparable to Western 
civilization through catching up in aid spending with the rest of the donor countries. 
Finally, Japan hoped to consolidate its national pride by demonstrating Japan’s own 
experience as the recipient of foreign aid in the postwar period and how Japan 
transformed itself from one of the largest recipients of aid to one of the largest providers 
of aid (Orr 1989-1990:479; Yasutomo 1989-1990; Yasutomo 1995; Lancaster 2010:35-
36; Sato and Shimomura 2013). These observations resonate with the Japanese state’s 
initiatives between the 1980s and 1990s. These initiatives aimed to construct Japan’s 
unique development model and philosophy based on its historical experiences of postwar 
economic development (King and McGrath 2004:156-173; Lancaster 2007:124-125 
and129).  
 This desire to construct national identity and “symbolic power”18 through the 
means of foreign aid also coincided with Japan’s emerging domestic contexts of “new 
nationalism19” in the late 1980s. According to Iida (2002), 1989 was a landmark year, 
which marked both an end and a new beginning for Japanese economy and polity. 1989 
saw the death of Emperor Hirohito, which brought a closure to the six-decade long 
Showa era (1926-1989). It was also the end of the postwar economic recovery and the so- 
                                               
18 A number of scholars have demonstrated the role of nationalist myths and symbols in constructing a 
state’s collective identity (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Smith 1988; Smith 1991; Hobbsbawm 1992; 
Migdal 1997:228-230; Loveman 2005). Some also discuss the case of the Japanese state’s identity 
construction (Lee 2006; Ashizawa 2008). 
19 It is important to note that the “new nationalism” of Japan did not happen in a vacuum. Indeed, there 
have been various types of nationalisms throughout Japanese history. However, what many scholars seem 
to suggest is that the nature of its nationalism greatly transformed in the 1980s with the advent of various 
external as well as internal pressures (Pyle 1988; Iida 2002; McVeigh 2004). 
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called “1955 system of politics”—the Liberal Democratic Party’s political monopoly that 
lasted for four decades. Japan faced the beginning of the decline of its economic power 
caused by the financial deflation known as the “burst of the bubble economy,” which was 
followed by the long lasting Heisei era recession. Globally, the Soviet Union collapsed 
and the U.S.-led “New World Order” began with the Gulf War which brought new global 
obligations to Japan as well (Iida 2002:209-225; Hein 2008:448).  
 Some scholars suggest that this new nationalism not only highlighted Japan’s new 
stance vis-à-vis the U.S. but also toward Asia. For example, there was the idea of the 
“flying geese model” of economic development that resurfaced during the 1980s and 
1990s within a large circle of Japanese economic bureaucracies. This model 
conceptualized Japan’s role in Asia as a powerful “leading geese” whose development 
model should be replicated by other Asian nations in order to achieve greater regional 
economic integration (Terry 2002:93). In 1995, a key Japanese bureaucrat was quoted in 
the Los Angeles Times agreeing that, “Half of the prosperity of Southeast Asia is the 
achievement of Japan” (Jameson 1995)20. According to McVeigh (2004:273), despite the 
fact that Japan was growing confident and was speaking out in the 1990s, “What troubles 
us is that Japan’s new nationalism is linked to a sentimental and patronizing notion of 
‘Asianism21’ that appears to be defined only in contrast with an equally vague conception 
of ‘Western’ values’”22 
                                               
20 Terry (2002:93) quoting from (Jameson 1995). 
21 It is important to note that because Japanese bureaucrats held rather “patronizing” views toward Asia, at 
least within the foreign aid sphere, the bureaucrats did not yet seem to recognize the emerging East Asian 
economic powers such as China or Korea as economic and political threats. These rapidly growing East 
Asian countries were seen as essential partners and key resources for Japan’s future economic growth. For 
example, in the aftermath of China’s massacre of students in Tiananmen Square in June 1989, Japan 
initially joined Western donor’s efforts to pursue aid sanction against China. However, Japan almost 
immediately initiated an international campaign to soften sanctions against China. According to Yasutomo 
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 Meanwhile, domestically, public criticisms and backlash against the rigid 
institutions of Japanese policy bureaucracies and their inability to deal with emerging 
global issues began to emerge in the early 1990s23 (Noguchi 1995a; Ōmae 1995; Vogel 
2005; Hein 2008:448; Hatch 2010:144-145). According to Gao (2000), globalization also 
presented serious challenges to Japan’s established institutions and the norms and values 
that governed the Japanese state. The advent of globalization generated a variety of 
intense economic policy debates domestically such as “a major battle between the market 
principle and the institutionalized beliefs of developmentalism” (Gao 2000:451). Such 
context might have reinforced some portion of Japanese bureaucrats’ desire to cement 
their legitimacy by reconstructing Japan’s national identity, pride and goals in ways that 
would resonate with a larger Japanese public. The institutional crisis within these 
bureaucracies also seemed to have enhanced bureaucrats’ desire to reestablish 
institutional morality and legitimacy.  
 This shift to pursuing more symbolic goals through foreign aid was concentrated 
in the OECF, which was established in March 1961. Its decision-making was supervised 
by four ministries: the Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)24 and the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA)25(See Figure 1). According to the OECF History Report 
                                                                                                                                            
(1993:328 and 336), then prime minister Kaifu made active efforts to persuade European and American 
leaders not to isolate China and to resume aid to Beijing. 
22 McVeigh (2004:273) quoting from (Hatch and Yamamura 1996, 27:199). 
23 For instance, the MOF had experienced one of the worst institutional crises in its history due to 
increasingly prevalent political scandals and corruption in the late 1980s. 
24 OECF History Report (2003:11) as well as Matsui (1983:61) noted that the initial proposal included the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as one of the supervising ministries, but later it was modified to 
include only three ministries: the MOF, MITI and MOFA as “consultation ministries” in addition to the 
EPA as “the supervising ministry.” 
25 According to Hirata (1998:314), the EPA played the least influential role over loan-related policy making 
among the four bureaucracies.  Despite the fact that the EPA held legal authority over the OECF, the other 
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(2003:14), it was established to support “economic cooperation” in Southeast Asia, 
especially to promote the industrial development of the region by providing “soft loans26” 
to the sectors that did not qualify to receive loans granted by the Export-Import Bank of 
Japan (JEXIM) or Japanese private financial institutions27. 
Figure 1: The OECF and Four Ministry System of Foreign Aid (Based on Lancaster 
2007:114). 
 
 
 
 
In 1966, the OECF began providing direct loans to the governments of developing 
countries (so-called “yen loans” because of its yen denomination) starting with South 
Korea in 1966, Taiwan in 1967, Malaysia and Indonesia in 1969, and Cambodia, 
                                                                                                                                            
three ministries carried much stronger influence over it than the EPA did. The EPA no longer exists as an 
independent agency. It was eliminated in 2001. 
26 A soft loan refers to a loan with comparatively lenient terms and conditions as compared to other loans in 
the market. For example, a soft loan generally offers a below-market interest rate and a longer repayment 
term.  
27 The JEXIM was established in 1950. Its primary task was to provide government-funded financial 
services (including export loans and equity financing) to private sectors to promote Japanese trade (import 
and export) and overseas investment. It also provided loans to developing countries so that they could 
import Japanese goods. The JEXIM offered loans with higher interest rates than ones provided by the 
OECF. The JEXIM was officially supervised by the MOF but guided closely by the MITI. 
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Afghanistan and Thailand in 196928. It is important to note that until 1966, all the OECF 
loans were given only to Japanese oversea business-related entities but not to the 
recipients’ governments (OECF 2003:28). Western criticisms about the commercial 
nature of Japanese aid began to emerge around this period, particularly from the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 29 (Araki 1997a:31-32; OECF 2003:20). For 
example, OECF’s “commodity loans” which started in 1968, were directly tied to 
Japanese export businesses. This infuriated Western donors (Araki 2005:276). After 
reflecting on this, the Japanese government announced its intention to revising the tied 
nature of Japanese aid at the UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade And 
Development) and began to untie commodity loans in 1972 (Araki 2005:276). Japan 
increasingly faced the need to construct a more refined system of development 
cooperation that met “Western standards” and was not focused on its own economic 
interests. 
In this context, the OECF became the designated agency for realizing a new 
conception of Japanese foreign aid—one that was focused on yen-denominated soft loans 
to meet the long-term economic development of developing countries, particularly ones 
in Asia. A key event that made this possible was a clear task differentiation between the 
JEXIM and the OECF. From 1973 to 1974, a member of the ruling party (Liberal 
Democratic Party), Tetsuro Minato, insisted on clear demarcation of tasks between the 
JEXIM and the OECF, the urgent need for reinstituting the OECF as the primary 
                                               
28 This does not mean however, that there were no yen loans dispersed by the Japanese government before 
1966. Japan was providing commercial yen loans to several governments in South Asia and Africa before 
1966 (OECF 2003:28)  
29 DAC members consist of many of the largest funders of foreign aid and became a part of the OECD in 
1961. The DAC has always emphasized the importance of grants and technical assistance over loans as a 
key part of foreign aid (Kusano 1997:144).   
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institution of yen loans and the importance of integrating social development initiatives 
as the OECF’s loan mission. After several difficult negotiations involving the supervising 
ministries along with the JEXIM and OECF, the final draft was approved in June 1975. 
This made the OECF the central institution for Japanese yen loans to developing 
countries (OECF 2003:31-33).  
Meanwhile, the OECF and the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM) started to 
develop themselves as clearly distinct institutions—the OECF being in charge of long-
term economic development in recipient countries focused on infrastructure aid30 while 
the JEXIM targeted the commercial sectors with the higher investment returns (OECF 
2003:28-29). Both continued to implement yen loans but different types of loans. The 
JEXIM focused on commercial loans with higher interest rates while the OECF provided 
soft loans. As the OECF began to establish its institutional base, it started to experiment 
and diversify its practices, which gave birth to various original loan disbursement tools 
such as “two-step loans.” These later become the central focus of the challenge in the 
1980s (OECF 2003:30).   
In line with the above reform of the Japanese aid bureaucracy, the institutional 
expansion and reorganization of the OECF proceeded and was completed in June 1974. 
One of the key features of this reform was to strengthen the research capacity of the 
OECF, especially its capacity to examine and evaluate the increasing number of yen 
loans. By the mid-1970s, the OECF’s provision of yen loans grew exponentially, from 7 
projects worth approximately 20 billion yen in 1966 to 63 projects worth approximately 
                                               
30 Infrastructure development generally includes constructing dams, power plants, electricity systems, 
railways, bridges, highways, and setting up factories etc.    
 
 
 
24 
280 billion yen in 1974 (OECF 2003:29). The number of staff also increased from 41 at 
its establishment in 1961 to 170 by 1975 (OECF 2003:36-37).   
OECF Research Quarterlies from the early 1970s clearly demonstrated the new 
thinking underlying Japanese foreign aid. Okita Saburo, one of the most influential 
economic bureaucrats in Japan’s foreign aid bureaucracy and, the third president of the 
OECF, warned of the dangers of the business-driven system of Japanese aid.  In 1972, 
Okita asserted in a “foreword” to OECF Research Quarterly,                                               
I believe that playing a significant role in actualizing the world-wide eradication 
of poverty is a task given to today’s Japanese people. Actively dealing with such a 
task is essential both to promote Japan’s international status and to remake 
Japan’s existing image as a selfish, short-sighted, ‘economic-animal’” (OECF RQ 
1972/14:1 my translation).  
 
Similarly, two issues of OECF Research Quarterly of 1974, both began with a section 
discussing Tanaka’s visit to the ASEAN and problematized the business-driven structure 
of Japanese economic aid (OECF RQ 1974/16; OECF RQ1974/17).     
 
THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
 
I.  Restating the Research Questions 
Historical accounts of Japanese political economy demonstrate that through most 
of its postwar history, Japan had taken the role of the U.S.’s quiet younger brother—
being largely submissive to U.S. economic and political demands. Domestically, the 
Japanese state bureaucracy took an active role in engineering its own economic 
development but had been hesitant to take geopolitical leadership. However, this 
governance pattern began to shift as the economic and political circumstances 
surrounding Japan gradually changed in the late 1970s. It is suggested that Japan’s 
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dramatic increase in foreign aid and the institutional strengthening of the OECF in 
particular reflected such global historical transformations. 
At the same time, as discussed earlier, Japanese policy making had long been 
influenced by international pressure from the U.S. and other developed countries. This 
raises the question: why did Japan suddenly defy this tradition and oppose American 
development ideology in the late 1980s despite the fact that there were no other 
developed countries doing so? What other factors could have influenced Japan’s 
challenge to the Washington Consensus? 
 
II. Economic Interests 
An observer with a political economy framework might suggest that Japan’s 
challenge to the Washington Consensus in the late 1980s grew out of the shifting 
economic interests of Japan’s business sector. For example, political economy scholars 
often highlight the centrality of large Japanese corporations operating in developing 
countries, particularly in Asia, and how they benefited from an increase of overseas 
development aid and an increasing flow of yen loans from the Japanese state. The loans 
that financed local infrastructure development presumably brought these Japanese 
multinationals exclusive benefits such as enhanced access to local market and raw 
materials. Thus economic interests’ accounts stress a strong link between Japanese 
business interests and state foreign aid decision- making (Ensign 1992; Arase 1995; 
Söderberg 1996; Söderberg and Magnus 1996; Zhang 1996).  
Nevertheless, if the interests were purely pragmatic (the advancement of Japanese 
business interests), we would expect the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
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(MITI), to have taken more active roles in constructing the challenge of the Washington 
Consensus. The MITI had been the primary coordinator of Japanese overseas business 
interests, along with the Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), which handled Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) that supported Japanese overseas business; yet the MITI’s and 
JEXIM’s role in the challenge, as well as the construction of the East Asian model, was 
rather secondary. More importantly, if the goal was the pragmatic promotion of business 
interests in Asia, it seems almost certain that the Japanese state and its bureaucracy did 
not have to defy the Washington Consensus in such an open manner. In other words, the 
Japanese state could have continued with its traditional practice of quietly pursuing its 
economic interests while not standing up to the U.S.—but instead chose to challenge 
Washington publicly, and on the terrain of abstract ideas about economic development.   
 
III. Cultural Accounts       
Others might suggest that the Japanese state’s culturally unique development 
ideology / philosophy—which contradicted with American free-market ideas and 
values—was the major source of Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus 
(Fajnzylber 1990; Sakakibara 1993; Kosai and Tho 1994; Shiratori 1995; Yanagihara 
1998; Furuoka 2005). Many trace the origins of Japanese development ideology to pre-
World War II economic philosophy such as Kaname Akamatsu’s flying geese theory of 
development, which was considered to be a pure “Japanese” cultural construct. This 
scholarship seems to highlight the authenticity and cultural exclusivity of Japan’s 
developmental culture, ideas and philosophy. However, such a romanticized notion of 
culture does not seem to explain the actual nature and characteristics of Japan’s 
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development ideas. Indeed, since the start of its modernization in late 19th century, 
Japanese policy makers selectively chose and actively integrated some foreign ideas and 
systems that particularly resonated with Japanese historical experiences (Westney 1987). 
This process of “hybridization” of economic ideas was central in the construction of 
postwar developmentalist ideology in Japan (Gao 1997). Thus, even though Japanese 
economic ideology was seen as purely “cultural” and such cultural uniqueness has been 
repeatedly emphasized by Japanese policy makers as well as some Western scholars, it 
has always been an “imagined” concept.  
 
IV. Institutions and Ideas 
A third approach describes the behavior of states as emerging from historically- 
constituted institutions (Skocpol 1985; Pierson and Skocpol 2002; Steinmo 2008).  
Scholarship in the historical institutionalist tradition treats states as influenced by, but not 
reducible to, the powerful private interests that surround them (Skocpol 1985). In this 
view, states’ distinct organizational structures (e.g. the various institutional arrangements 
of government agencies) and their current and pre-existing policy legacies contribute to 
making their distinct policy choices.  
 Historical institutionalist scholarship brings up an important idea of “unintended 
consequences”—how state policies are often shaped by particular historical 
circumstances not of its own choosing. Examples of endogenous factors include the 
legacies of past policy decisions (e.g., laws, particular bureaucratic structures), the 
interests of policy makers, and their relationships with various internal and external social 
groups. Exogenous factors include the transnational economic and political environments 
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surrounding the state at specific historical eras (Evans 1985; Skocpol 1985; Weir and 
Skocpol 1985; Thelen and Steinmo 1992:16-17). A major advantage of this approach is 
that it allows us to examine the Japanese state’s independent capacity to organize a 
challenge (e.g. the state’s rigid institutional structure composed of a strong cohort of 
career bureaucrats/autonomy of its bureaucracy), while highlighting its relative position 
in relation to other states in the global political economy.   
A second advantage of adopting a historical institutionalist approach, from the 
point of view of this study, is that it allows for a more sophisticated conception of the role 
of ideas and culture in shaping policy outcomes (Hall 1992; King 1992; Weir 1992; 
Ikenberry 1993; Blyth 2002; Campbell 2002; Anderson 2008).  Ideas matter to the extent 
that they become embedded in the taken-for-granted practices of institutions, especially 
state bureaucracies. According to Weir and Skocpol (1985:118),  
[T]he administrative, fiscal, coercive, and judicial arrangements of given states, as 
well as the policies that states are already pursuing, influence the conceptions that 
groups or their representatives are likely to develop about what is desirable, or 
possible at all, in the realm of governmental action 
 
 For example, Hall (1993:279) demonstrated how “policy paradigms” played a 
central role in the Britain’s dramatic policy shift in the 1970s.  
[Policy paradigms] specified what the economic world was like, how it was to be 
observed, which goals were attainable through policy, and what instruments 
should be used to attain them. They became the prism through which 
policymakers saw the economy as well as their own role within it.   
 
Similarly, Weir (1992) highlighted the interdependent relationships between ideas, 
institutional structures and interests. Based on her historical study of American 
employment policy innovation between 1930 and 1980, she demonstrated how ideas 
drove and constrained institutional innovation and policy change, while at the same time, 
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institutions guided the development of particular ideas and interests among policy actors. 
Interestingly, contrary to some studies that mainly emphasized policy continuity (e.g. 
naturally occurring “path dependence”) of institutions, Hall and Weir recognized and 
advocated the potential roles of institutions and their ideas in facilitating a state’s policy 
innovation and change (Weir 1989; Hall 1992; Thelen and Steinmo 1992:24-26; Weir 
1992).  
To this historical institutionalist framework, I add two insights from “new 
institutionalist” scholarship in organizational sociology. First, institutions are 
constraining but not static, and may be transformed through the agency of strategically-
located actors, or “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein and Mara Drita 
1996; Fligstein 1997, Fligstein 2001). Second, the norms and ideas that shape state 
behavior can be transnational in scope. World polity theorists argue that national states 
share a common cultural framework of modern values (e.g., economic development), 
which leads to increasing similarity over time and the transmission of ideas across 
national boundaries (Meyer et al. 1994; Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1997; Meyer 
2000; Boli 2006).  Professions are a critically important vector for the transnational 
transmission of ideas, and one of the most important transnational professions is 
economics—a discipline that is consulted by states around the world, irrespective of 
political and cultural differences (Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). Yet because 
economics is not a perfectly unified discipline, states may draw selectively on expert 
ideas that best suit local circumstances and political agendas (Babb 2001; Taniguchi and 
Babb 2009).   
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RESEARCH METHOD AND MATERIALS 
To reiterate, my dissertation explores how the Japanese state came to oppose the 
hegemonic policies of the Washington Consensus and examines the origin of the ideas 
used in formulating the challenge. I utilized several research techniques that are widely 
used in historical institutional studies: process-tracing and drawing from a number of 
different sources. Many historical institutionalist scholars agree that historical 
institutionalism is as much a method as it is a theory (Steinmo 2008). According to 
Pierson and Skocpol (2002), there are three important methodological features that 
differentiate historical institutionalist work from others. First, it addresses big-substantive 
questions that interest a broad public as well as scholars. Second, it “takes time seriously” 
and develops temporal arguments by “specifying sequences and tracing transformations 
and processes of varying scale and temporality” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:695-696). 
Third, it conducts a macro analysis by highlighting “the combined effects of institutions 
and processes rather than examining just one institution or process at a time” (Pierson and 
Skocpol 2002:696). 
To take “time/history seriously,31” I traced the Japanese state’s foreign aid policy 
making focusing on two periods: a period preceding the challenge (from the post-World 
War II era to the mid-1980s), and the period of the actual challenge (from the late 1980s 
to the early 1990s). A great number of historical institutionalists advocate the idea of 
“path dependence” which is founded on the logic that “outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ 
trigger feedback mechanisms (negative or positive) that reinforce the recurrence of a 
particular pattern into the future” (Pierson and Skocpol 2002:699). Secondly, in my 
attempt to examine the multidimensional institutional dynamics of Japanese foreign aid 
                                               
31 Also see (Steinmo 2008:127). 
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policy making and to pay closer attention to macro historical contexts surrounding the 
state during these periods, I used a combination of secondary and primary sources. These 
included academic and nonacademic publications, newspapers and journal articles in 
English and Japanese, as well as information from the bureaucracies derived from their 
own websites and from a series of publications and historical documents published by the 
bureaucracies. For instance, I obtained much of the statistical information on Japanese 
foreign aid from a series of annual reports32 published by the MITI. I found the ones 
published between 1980 and 1994 (14 volumes) particularly useful for my research. 
In addition, in order to provide a more contextual and nuanced account of the 
actual challenge and to explore the origins of the ideas driving the challenge, I traced 
Japan’s policy-making processes by focusing on institutional policy discourses of the 
OECF. The main source for my analysis was a consecutive series of quarterlies published 
by the OECF between 1968 and 1999 33. Nighty-nine issues were published during this 
period, and each issue is approximately 150 to 200 pages in length. I read all of the issues, 
constructed detailed notes and performed content analyses to investigate the overall 
patterns and ideological changes in the OECF’s policy discourse and policy making. 
Additional sources include, but are not limited to, Japanese government’s whitepapers on 
foreign aid, OECF’s discussion papers that were published between 1994 and 199934 and 
a 508 page-long historical volume produced by the OECF in 2003 that traces its 50 years 
of organizational history. 
                                               
32 The title of the annual report is “Economic cooperation: Current conditions and issues” (Keizai Kyoryoku 
no Genjyo to Mondaiten). They were published annually by the MITI between 1958 and 2001. 
33 “The OECF Research Quarterly” was published between 1968 and1994 and changed its name to “Journal 
of Development Assistance”(1994-1999). When cited in the text, The OECF Research Quarterly is 
abbreviated as OECF RQ and The Journal of Development Assistance is abbreviated as OECF JDA. I 
added their issue number after the year of publication for clarity.  
34 OECF Discussion Papers are abbreviated as OECF DP when cited in the text. 
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OECF research quarterlies contain a wide range of information, and their intended 
audience is Japanese foreign aid bureaucrats. For example, they contain a combination of 
research papers, opinion pieces, summaries of key development reports and minutes of 
symposiums and roundtable discussions on the latest issues of Japanese economic 
aid/loans and global economic development. A large portion of the contents of these 
quarterlies was written and prepared by OECF bureaucrats while some of it was prepared 
by selected external researchers from major think tanks and Japanese academia. Such 
publications, in which discourses of development among bureaucrats were embedded, 
highlight the issues, interests and concerns of not only the institution of the OECF but 
also the Japanese economic development bureaucracy and the state at large. 
All of the primary sources were gathered at several private and public libraries 
across Japan including, but not limited to, Seinan Gakuin University Library, Fukuoka 
Prefectural Library and the National Diet Library. Since it is the only national library in 
Japan, the National Diet Library owns the most extensive and complete selection of the 
materials published by the OECF as well as other economic bureaucracies. I also 
contacted the public relations office at the JBIC (Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation) Institute35 to collect issues that were not available or missing from the 
above libraries.  
My chapters are designed to tackle each of my main research questions. In 
Chapter two, I explore why the Japanese state chose to oppose American ideological 
hegemony in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In this chapter, I analyze the political and 
economic environments that promoted the Japanese state to change its foreign aid 
                                               
35 The JBIC Institute holds the majority of historical materials related to the OECF because the OECF and 
the JEXIM were merged in 1999 to create the JBIC. 
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strategy during this period. I begin by evaluating two competing theoretical explanations. 
First, I present a materialist account that emphasizes the centrality of Japanese business 
elites and their economic interests in driving the shift. Second, I explore an institutionalist 
/state-centered account that highlights the autonomy of the Japanese state and the 
changing power configurations among its bureaucracies. I argue that a mixture of 
economic, institutional and political factors drove Japan to make a gradual shift in foreign 
aid strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
In Chapter three, I explore the origins of the ideas that challenged the Washington 
Consensus by tracing the policy discourses of the OECF during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Based on this analysis, I argue that not only economic and political factors, but 
also the developmentalist idea that valued the central role of the state in its economic 
development were essential in instigating Japan’s construction and promotion of its own 
development model challenging the Washington Consensus. I further argue that Japan’s 
challenge was both a local and a global social construct, developed in the processes of 
interaction with other states and their actors, and drawing on internationally available 
economic ideas. 
In Chapter four, I review the main findings and arguments of the dissertation, and 
return to addressing the puzzle posed at the beginning. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Shift in Japan’s Foreign Aid Strategy in the 1980s and 1990s: Material Interests or 
Institutional Politics? 
 
Prior to the 1980s, Japanese foreign aid had been merely used for fostering the 
short-term interests of Japanese businesses, particularly the interests of Japan’s aid 
project contractors.  However, during the late 1980s, Japanese foreign aid began to be 
transformed into a vehicle for promoting a particular “model” of export-oriented 
industrialization based on Japanese development experience. For example, rising 
concerns among Japan’s foreign aid officials regarding the lack of a “Japanese model” 
were documented in official publications during the late 1980s. A 1987 report by the 
Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) quoted a comment by a foreign aid 
official that states “Although Japan has become the second largest provider of foreign aid 
in the world . . . it is not clear what Japan is trying to execute based on what 
principles. . . .Unless Japan presents [to the international community] a specific set of 
principles and endorses actions that derive from these principles, its foreign aid will only 
be considered as a continuation of the past aid practice [of promoting its business 
interests through aid]” (OECF RQ 1987/57:159, my translation). What were the political 
and economic environments that instigated Japanese state to change its strategy of foreign 
aid in the 1980s and early 1990s? How did this shift happen?    
In this chapter, I evaluate two competing theoretical explanations for Japan’s 
foreign aid strategy shift: first, a political economy/materialist account that emphasizes 
the centrality of Japanese business elites and their economic interests in driving the shift. 
The second is an institutionalist /state-centered account that highlights the autonomy of 
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the Japanese state and its institutions in shaping the course of change. A large number of 
the Western literature suggests that the shift in Japan’s foreign aid strategy in the late 20th 
century was largely driven by several economic events and forces surrounding the state 
and its private sectors. However, I follow a few interdisciplinary literature (Yasutomo 
1986; Yasutomo 1995; Wade 1996; Shimomura et al. 1999: Ch 2; Terry 2002; Lancaster 
2007; Lee 2008) in proposing that there were also political and institutional causes for the 
shift. After closely examining both positions, I observed that the Japanese government 
used foreign aid to serve “multiple purposes” (Lancaster 2007:7) —domestic and 
international as well as economic and political. 
Overall, I argue that a mixture of economic, institutional and political factors 
contributed to Japan’s shift in foreign aid strategy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Material factors, particularly the changing economic environments of the 1980s affecting 
the Japanese state and its private sectors, pushed forward the early development of the 
shift. Importantly, they laid a foundation for the state’s particular political interests to 
emerge. At the same time, unintended institutional consequences, mainly the 
reconfiguration of power dynamics among the four ministries of foreign aid and a key 
political change, namely Japan’s intensified involvement in multilateral development 
organizations, were indispensable in driving the latter shift of Japanese foreign aid 
strategy toward promulgating a national model.  
 
POLITICAL ECONOMY EXPLANATION  
 The scholars interested in the political economy of Japanese foreign aid (Lincoln 
1993; Arase 1995; Söderberg and Berg 1996) point to the importance of the 
unprecedented economic challenges faced by the Japanese state and private sectors in the 
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1980s—increasing state capital surplus and the appreciation of the Japanese yen—in 
reshaping the structure of Japanese foreign aid. Within this view, a strong link between 
Japanese business interests and the state’s foreign aid decision-making is highlighted.               
 More specifically, they argue that the signing of the Plaza accord in 1985 (which 
devalued the U.S. dollar 36 and in turn appreciated the Japanese yen) greatly impacted the 
shift in Japan’s foreign aid strategy by increasing trade and investment with Asia. 
Between 1985 and 1986, the yen’s overseas purchasing power doubled while 
simultaneously making Japanese manufacturing less competitive in the global market due 
to higher domestic costs of production. The higher value of the Japanese yen also meant 
that Japanese companies needed to and were capable of transferring these uncompetitive 
manufacturing sectors abroad. Southeast Asia looked most attractive in that regard due to 
Japan’s deep historical and geographical ties to the region, along with the low cost of 
land and low wages. In this context, foreign aid, including subsidized yen loans (e.g. two-
step loans37) provided by the Japanese government to the target sectors in the recipient 
countries began to be seen as a strategic tool for the Japanese government to support its 
overseas manufacturing sector38. Edward Lincoln (1993:123) asserts that the Japanese 
government’s increased emphasis on yen loans in the 1980s provided “a convenient way 
                                               
36 During the early 1980s, the energy crisis drove the U.S. into serious economic recession with a rising 
current account deficit. The U.S. hoped to tackle these problems by pressuring Japan and Germany to sign 
the Plaza Accord in 1985 that would have depreciated the U.S. dollar relative to the Japanese yen and the 
German deutsche mark. This was intended to increase the U.S. trade surplus and improve conditions in 
manufacturing sectors such as the automobile industry, which was hit hard by the recession.   
37 Two-step loans are a type of yen loans that are first given to the local financial institutions then to the 
private sector, particularly small and medium enterprises as well as agricultural sector of these countries. 
38 Interestingly, Söderberg and Berg (1996:72) note that the MITI, the prime supporter of the interests of 
Japanese businesses had become enthusiastic about the idea of increasing Japanese aid to export industries 
of Southeast Asia after the signing of the Plaza Accord. The MITI had long opposed the idea during the 
1970s and early 1980s.   
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to keep aid money flowing into projects likely to benefit Japanese commercial interests.” 
Similarly, David Arase (1995:111) states,  
[I]ncreased ODA spending also served Japan’s own interests . . . because in 
coordination with trade and investment measures, the ODA could play a role in 
restructuring Japan’s industrial profile and raising its position in the international 
division of labor.  
 
 Japan’s capital recycling plan initiated by the MOF and implemented by the 
OECF and Export-Import Bank of Japan (JEXIM), which provided additional forms of 
subsidized loans and investments to the recipient countries, was considered to offer 
unique solutions to addressing the emerging economic needs of the Japanese state and its 
businesses. For example, The OECF, the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) and 
the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO)39 jointly issued a report in October 1986, 
urging the Japanese government to increase its assistance to the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations). The report recommended the enhanced use of yen loans, 
particularly the use of two-step loans to promote the export-oriented industries in the 
ASEAN. In turn, such development would attract more Japanese businesses and 
encourage Japanese direct investments in the long run. In accordance with the report’s 
content, the MITI announced the “New Asian Industries Development (AID) Plan” in 
Bangkok in 1987.40  As a major part of the government’s capital recycling plan, the 
ASEAN-Japan Development Fund (AJDF) was also founded in 1987, by then Prime 
Minister Noboru Takeshita. The AJDF had two primary components: one was to 
stimulate intra-ASEAN development projects and the other was to provide two-step loans 
to small and medium scale industries that supported export manufacturing in the 
                                               
39 The IDE and the JETRO were considered to be MITI’s subsidiaries. 
40 See (MITI 1986; MITI 1987:166-170; MITI 1992:170). 
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ASEAN41 where a number of Japanese companies were investing. The OECF and 
JEXIM administered the fund, and the Japanese government had pledged to give more 
than $2 billion over three years. Approximately, $1.43 billion was used to implement 
loans executed by both the OECF and the JBIC in the region42. Japan’s two-step loans 
program in the Philippines that stirred the conflict between the OECF and the World 
Bank were a central component of AJDF finance initiative. 
 
 I.  Japan’s Material Interests Reflected in the Two-Step Loan Projects  
 By looking at a specific case in Thailand, Arase (1995) argues that the two-step 
loan initiative implemented by the OECF greatly supported the Japanese private sector’s 
commercial interests. The Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) 
rural lending program in Thailand began in 1976. The OECF provided initial loans to the 
BAAC so that it could make small, subsidized loans to rural farmers. Based on BAAC’s 
evaluation report from the period 1981-1982, along with some interviews, Arase argues 
that BAAC loan recipients (in this case they were mostly creditworthy, small holding, 
relatively well-off farmers) used a portion of their loans to purchase consumer goods (e.g. 
electronics, motorcycles) as well as farm machinery that were mostly produced by the 
Japanese companies as well as Japanese-Thai joint ventures. Thus, according to Arase 
(1995:101-102), disbursement of two-step loans in Thailand in the early 1980s, also 
benefitted the Japanese private sectors’ economic interests. Similarly, one could argue 
that two-step loans programs that focused on small and medium enterprises as well as 
export promotion industries in Asia were an essential tool for Japanese parent companies 
                                               
41 The aid particularly promoted economic development of ASEAN 4 countries specifically Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. 
42 See MOFA website (http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/asean/j_asean/ja_skj_04.html). 
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to establish reliable subcontracting firms (“shitauke” firms) in Southeast Asia, which 
could benefit the parent companies in the long run.                                                         
 Table 1 demonstrates the percentage of projects receiving two-step loans among 
all projects funded by yen loans between 1966 and 1990. Japan’s total disbursement of 
yen loans shows a steady increase between 1985 and 1988. It drops slightly in 1989 but 
resumes its increase in 1990. Two-step loans follow a similar pattern up to 1989; 
however, their disbursement significantly drops in 1990. The percent of projects funded 
by two-step loans in the overall body of projects funded by yen loans is the highest 
between 1987 and 1989, when two-step loan projects comprised more than 6 % of overall 
yen loan projects. This makes sense considering the establishment of the ASEAN-Japan 
Development Fund (AJDF) in 1987. In 1990, disbursement of two-step loans dropped to 
3% of the overall number of yen loan projects. 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Two-Step Loans to Overall Yen Loans 
  
* Denomination is in 100 million Japanese yen. 
* * Percentage of two-step loans per yen loans is calculated based on the number of projects. 
Source: Table adapted from (OECF 1992/74:110). Translation and percentage calculation by the author. 
 
 
 
 
 
1966 -1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Disbursement of Overall Yen Loans * 49,200 5,568 5,423 7,193 10,917 8,460 10,068
Number of Projects 997 85 67 97 133 105 100
Disbursement of Two-Step Loans as a Part of Yen Loans * 545 51 118 303 1,338 708 445
Number of Projects 13 2 1 6 8 7 3
Percentage of Two-Step Loans Per Overall Yen Loans * * 1.3 2.3 1.5 6.1 6 6.6 3
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Table 2: Distribution of Yen Loans by Types (In Percentages) 
 
Source: Content in the table is selectively adapted from (MITI 1993:85) based on OECF data. Translated 
by the author. 
 
 Table 2 shows various types of yen loans and their percentages of the total 
between 1971 and 1990. The top three sectors that constitute the largest portion of yen 
loans between 1981 and 1990 are commodity loans, transportation related loans, and 
electricity and gas related loans. Together, they represent more than 60 % of the overall 
yen loan disbursement between 1986 and 1990. Based on the above figures, it is safe to 
argue that Japanese commercial interests continued to be presented in Japan’s overall 
foreign aid disbursement. However, it is hard to argue that two-step loans represent 
Japan’s business interests. For example, two-step loans account for only 6.6 % of the 
overall number of yen loans during the same period. Table 1 and 2 both show a solid 
increase in the amount of two-step loans during the late 1980s, however, Table 2 clearly 
demonstrates how small the two-step loan initiative was in comparison to other major 
loan initiatives.  Findings from the above Tables also make us wonder why the 
disbursement of two- step loans decreased in 1990, despite the fact that the government’s 
efforts to shift foreign aid strategy continued in the early 1990s.                                       
1971-1975 1976-1980 1981-1985 1986-1990
Commodity Loans 22.6 17.2 15.1 23.4
Two-Step Loans 0.7 1 0.6 6.6
Social Services 1.1 5.4 6.7 7.2
Mining and Manufacturing Industries 22.5 9.7 10.2 6.9
Agriculture and Fisheries 2.9 3.7 2.2 1.1
Irrigation 2.5 4.4 7.4 3.6
Communication 5.7 5.9 7 6.8
Transportation 23.8 27.1 25.8 23
Electricity and Gas 17.6 22.5 24.4 17.3
Others 0.7 0.2 0.5 4
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 In the following section, I will shift my attention to an alternative view focusing 
on the institutional and political circumstances of the Japanese state and its foreign aid 
bureaucracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
INSTITUTIONAL/STATE-CENTERED EXPLANATION 
 According to Theda Skocpol (1985), state autonomy is defined as its capacity to 
formulate and pursue policy goals that are independent of the demands of dominant 
groups in the society. Contrary to the materialist perspective that largely focuses on the 
dominant class’s material interests in driving states’ policy making, state autonomy 
theorists highlight state’s sovereign capacity to act regardless of the influences of 
dominant social groups. State autonomy theorists demonstrate how states’ distinct 
organizational structures (e.g. various institutional arrangements of government 
ministries) and their current and pre-existing policy legacies contribute to make states’ 
distinct policy choices. According to Weir and Skocpol (1985:118),                        
[T]he administrative, fiscal, coercive, and judicial arrangements of given states, as 
well as the policies that states are already pursuing, influence the conceptions that 
groups or their representatives are likely to develop about what is desirable, or 
possible at all, in the realm of governmental action.                                                                                             
Guided by the above theoretical perspective, I hypothesize that an important institutional 
factor of the Japanese state in the late 1980s and early 1990s, namely the shift in 
decision-making power configuration within the four main aid bureaucracies, helped to 
transform Japan’s foreign aid strategy. Before making detailed arguments, I will first 
provide some important background context of Japanese foreign aid in which this 
bureaucratic power shift took place.  
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I. The Background Contexts of Japanese Foreign Aid  
A. The untying of Japanese foreign aid        
 As Japan became one of the largest aid providers in the world, external political 
pressure from the international aid community, the U.S. in particular, climaxed, which 
accelerated the “untying43” of Japanese foreign aid in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Mounting international criticism of Japan’s business-like aid (focused on the benefit of its 
contractors), as well as international demands for Japan’s greater aid leadership, matched 
with its growing financial contribution, led the Japanese state to move away from its 
traditionally private sector-driven structure of foreign aid, which was always supported 
by the provision of a high proportion of yen loans that were “tied” to Japanese businesses. 
In particular, Japanese aid’s heavy reliance on yen loans rather than “grants” had been 
repeatedly criticized by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD as 
commercially-driven. The Japanese government’s initial announcement in 1978 that it 
would “untie” its yen loan portion of aid, along with reinforced commitments to “untie” 
repeated in government’s official midterm foreign aid goals published in 1985 and 1988, 
represented direct reactions to these shifting circumstances of the Japanese government in 
the global political economy. Government data shows a gradual untying of Japanese 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s44  
 
                                               
43 Any foreign aid is generally categorized into three patterns of procurement: untied, partially tied, and tied. 
“Untied aid” allows any other country’s suppliers (companies) to enter bidding for implementation of 
projects and programs that will be financed by the ODA of the donor country. For example, if Japanese 
ODA is used to build a dam in Asia, untied ODA allows any other country’s companies to enter the bidding 
process to win the contract. “Partially tied aid” also called LDC untied aid, only allows suppliers from the donor 
country and developing countries to enter the bidding. Under “tied aid,” only the suppliers from the donor country can 
enter the bidding. 
44 See Appendix A.   
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B. Political scandal and domestic consensus toward an increased role of state in the 
foreign aid sphere            
 In addition to external pressures from international aid communities, the state’s 
internal factors, particularly the shaking domestic political circumstances surrounding 
foreign aid in the late 1980s, pushed forward the untying of Japanese foreign aid. It 
consequently contributed to the shift in decision-making power from businesses to the 
government. Specifically, the 1986 foreign aid corruption scandal (the so-called “Marcos” 
scandal) made it challenging for the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government 
to justify the commercially-driven nature of Japan’s foreign aid in front of an 
increasingly critical domestic constituency.       
 After the end of autocratic rule by Ferdinando Marcos and the installation of 
Corazon Aquino as the newly elected president of the Philippines in 1986, suspicion 
arose that Marcos had been receiving “kick-backs” from a number of Japanese private 
contractors involved in yen loan financed projects. Marcos’ accumulated wealth and its 
relation to Japanese foreign aid became heated topic in the Japanese Diet. Opposition 
parties denounced the LDP government for allowing such fraud and highlighted ties 
between the recipient government and the Japanese private sector. Repeated inquires at 
the Diet, as well as the mass media’s enthusiastic reporting on the issue, made Japanese 
tax-payers highly suspicious of the government’s foreign aid operations as a whole. The 
Japanese government refused to reveal the names of the companies that were involved in 
foreign aid bidding in the Philippines, which made the Japanese populace further 
question the close relationship between the government and the private sector45 (Arase 
                                               
45 Mal-behavior of Japanese businesses and the lack of government leadership in foreign aid operations had 
been problematized since the early 1970s. However, in the aftermath of the Marcos scandal, public scrutiny 
surged, which led to the state-wide open debate over the issue. 
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1995:114-116; Yasutomo 1995; Araki 1997b; Shimomura et al. 1999:Ch 2).   
 The Marcos scandal and its aftermath also instigated a number of heated 
discussions about the future shape of Japanese foreign aid. The Japanese populace not 
only criticized the commercial nature of Japanese aid, but also the lack of clear principles 
and philosophy of aid on the part of the Japanese government. The critics argued that 
such a lack of principles often led the government to accommodate its foreign aid 
strategy to be in line with the overall American strategy. Domestic campaigns to reform 
Japanese aid policy-making structure emerged not only from oppositional parties in the 
Diet, but also from NGOs, grassroots groups and even business-interests groups. Overall, 
all these groups, to one degree or another, criticized the power struggles among the four 
ministries of foreign aid46 as an obstacle to smooth and transparent aid policy making and 
promoted the idea of establishing a centralized aid agency with a single set of objectives 
and procedures (Arase 1995:Ch 6; Shimomura et al. 1999:Ch 2). By the end of the 1980s, 
domestic consensus demanded that the Japanese government to promote stronger 
leadership and a more unified foreign aid strategy. Next I will discuss the institutional 
and political explanations for the shift in Japan’s foreign aid strategy by highlighting the 
power configurations of distinct ministries in the 1980s.   
                   
II. The Shifting Power of Aid Bureaucracies  
 Several interdisciplinary studies point to the declining influence of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) over the government’s foreign aid decision-
                                               
46 Struggles among the four ministry system of foreign aid referred to not-unified and competitive decision-
makings that occurred among the four ministries, MITI, MOF, MOFA and EPA. In many other developed 
nations, aid policy is often determined by a single agency (e.g. USAID in the U.S.) During the period I 
examined, EPA’s influence within the foreign aid policy making was very limited.  
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making in the 1980s (Potter 1994:208; Hirata 1998:320; Kim 2004; Lancaster 2007; 
Lancaster 2010). Prior to the 1980s, MITI maintained a dominating influence in the 
foreign aid sphere due to the fact that Japan’s aid project contractors’ economic needs 
were primarily communicated through MITI, which drove the overall foreign aid policy 
making47. Thus, the government’s reduced emphasis since the late 1970s, on 
accommodating Japanese business interests, primarily those of foreign aid contractors, 
seemed to have led to MITI’s gradual decline in institutional power in foreign aid policy 
making. As mentioned above, the untying of foreign aid created tension in the long-
established relationship between the Japanese government and foreign aid contractors. As 
a result, it weakened the previously closely-dependent relationship between the two in the 
sphere of foreign aid. For example, Araki (2005:185-186 and 286-288) documents how 
the government’s tough promotion of untying foreign aid, accompanied by the 
appreciation of Japanese yen in the late 1980s, made it far more difficult for Japanese 
companies to win ODA bidding, which accelerated the private sector’s detachment from 
projects financed by yen loans. Previously, the Japanese private sector was highly 
involved in picking out new projects and shaping such projects at a local level before the 
yen loans’ approval by the government; however, the unpredictability of getting the 
projects (through the bidding) made it unattractive for the private sector to enter into and 
invest in yen loan financed projects in developing countries (Yasutomo 1986:71; Araki 
2005:185-186 and 286-288; Lancaster 2007:120 and 139). MITI’s institutional decline 
can be understood as an unintended consequence of the above processes.  
                                               
47 MITI had been the bureaucracy which held the primary liaison/communication channel with the Japanese 
private sector and it had long promoted the interests of private sectors reflected in Japan’s foreign aid 
decision-making. 
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 Meanwhile, various observers of Japanese foreign aid reported on the increased 
influence/power of the other two bureaucracies within the four ministry system—the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) —in Japan’s 
overall foreign aid decision-making during the period (Hirata 1998; Kim 2004; Lancaster 
2007; Lancaster 2010). Regarding the MOFA, its institutional goal had always been the 
promotion of the diplomatic interests of the Japanese government by managing relations 
with other governments as well as international organizations. The MOFA demonstrated 
a growing emphasis in strategically shaping Japan’s relationship with Southeast Asia and 
the U.S. through the use of foreign aid in the 1980s and 1990s.  Meanwhile, as the 
principle and most influential bureaucracy holding full control over Japan’s internal and 
external financial matters, the MOF became a powerful voice in Japan’s foreign aid 
sphere as the sum and strategic importance of foreign aid increased tremendously during 
the period.  For instance, the signing of the Plaza Accord and the subsequent appreciation 
of the yen, along with growing international criticism of Japan’s business-like foreign aid, 
raised the strategic importance of foreign aid for the Japanese government. In addition to 
providing direct loans (e.g. yen loans) to developing countries, the government began to 
utilize the channel of multilateral aid for the further disbursement of surplus cash that 
needed to be recycled as foreign aid. Thus, MOF’s tasks related to international finance, 
including negotiations with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World 
Bank and the IMF, increased tremendously during the 1980s and 1990s.                                   
 Overall, I argue that the weakening of the business-driven structure of Japanese 
foreign aid along with a political change—namely the intensified government 
involvement in multilateral development organizations since the late 1980s—represent 
 
 
 
47 
the key factors that led to the reduction of the overriding power of the MITI and 
increased importance of the MOF (and the MOFA) in the foreign aid sphere. This seemed 
to have leveled decision-making power among the four bureaucracies and contributed to 
the construction of a relatively more unified foreign aid strategy under the flag of the 
Japanese government48. At the same time, the promotion of Japan’s development model 
accommodated the mixture of interests of these distinct bureaucracies. For example, as 
the MOF gained greater voice in foreign aid decision-making, it became a leader in 
constructing and promoting the Japanese development model. Some scholars argue that 
the ideology behind the model, particularly the importance of the role of the state in 
economic development (especially financial management) truly resonated with the long-
lived institutional norm within the MOF. This idea also supported the more protectionist 
tendency of the state (Hartcher 1998; Lee 2008)49. From MOFA’s stance, shifting Japan’s 
international image from economic animals to an international aid leader would have 
been a great plus for meeting their institutional goal of increasing Japan’s influence in the 
international diplomatic arena50. For the MITI, disseminating the Japanese development 
model could potentially bring more support for Japanese multinationals by creating a 
positive image of these multinationals as leaders of economic development in the region. 
I argue that in this shifting institutional context surrounding Japan’s foreign aid, the 
                                               
48 According to Hartcher (1998:3), MOF’s bureaucrats had long held an assumption that the MOF was the 
only bureaucracy which could truly represent the state’s national interest due to the fact that “the other 
ministries, which preside over particular sectors of the society, are tainted by their interest in the health of 
their constituent industries” (Hartcher 1998:3). Thus MOF considers itself as the “ministry of ministries.” 
This observation may help us to understand why the rise of the MOF in the foreign aid sphere was essential 
for constructing more unified foreign aid strategy as well as a national model.  
49 For example, Hartcher (1998:189-196) demonstrates how the idea of Japan as an alternative model of 
capitalism proposed by the influential MOF official, Eisuke Sakakibara resonated within the institutional 
culture of the MOF. The idea was used to defend MOF’s institutional authority and legitimacy in 1990s, 
particularly its struggle over the deregulation of the Japanese economy. In addition, Lee (2008) shows that 
the MOF became a leader in promoting the East Asian model because the MOF as an institution embraced 
a particular normative structure that valued the role of the state in economic development.     
50 See Hirata (1998:314-315). 
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emergence of the Japanese development model became possible. These findings resonate 
with Lancaster’s observation that “the way governments organize themselves to manage 
their aid—whether aid programs and policy-making are fragmented or unified and where 
they are located in the bureaucratic hierarchy—determines the voice and influence of the 
interests within government on aid’s purposes” (Lancaster 2007:7)                                  
 
III. Japan’s Quest for International Legitimacy       
 The transfer of decision-making power from the private sector to the state also 
meant that the Japanese government could use foreign aid as a strategic tool to tackle 
multilayered issues facing the state—from dealing with domestic and international 
economic issues to responding to external political and diplomatic pressures.   
 For instance, several scholars, largely in the field of Political Science and 
International Political Economy (IPE), (Awanohara 1995; Yasutomo 1995; Emig 1999; 
Terry 2002; Lee 2008) suggest that the Japanese state’s quest for international legitimacy 
—namely its repeated attempts to increase its political power and influence within 
multilateral development organizations, particularly the World Bank— played a key role 
in the reshaping of Japanese foreign aid strategy. This resonates with state autonomy 
theorists’ view that highlights the nation-state’s relative position in relation to other states 
in global political economy and how such external factors influence states’ decision-
making. Both emphasize the Japanese state’s independent capacity to produce this shift.  
 According to this view, the World Bank became strategically important for the 
Japanese state while it was becoming less and less important for the U.S. after the end of 
the Cold War. Japan hoped to increase its international status and legitimacy (a symbolic 
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form of state power) by gaining more influence within multilateral development 
organizations while the domestic economic recession and the end of the Cold War made 
it difficult for the U.S. to maintain its monetary contribution to the Bank in the late 1980s. 
Furthermore, as Japan rose to an economic superpower in the late 1980s, its “self-
conscious” feeling toward taking global economic leadership also increased. According 
to Toyoo Gyoten, one of the most highly ranked and influential officials at the MOF 
during the time, “Japan’s collective view of its power,” and feeling of leadership toward 
the management of international finance grew after the Plaza accord, followed by Japan’s 
economic “bubble” (Tadokoro and Iokibe 1996).     
 Meanwhile, despite its desire to elevate its position in the global aid sphere, Japan 
was not successful in augmenting its political power and representation within 
multilateral aid sphere. For years, even though Japan had become the second largest 
shareholder at the Bank in 1984, neither its voting shares nor its presence in the 
management rose relative to its financial contribution to the Bank (Awanohara 1995; 
Yasutomo 1995:66-67). Japanese nationals represented only 2 % of the staff at 
multilateral financial institutions including the World Bank, the International 
Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the ADB 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)—a percentage that was dramatically 
lower than those of the majority of key member states (Hirono 1991:175) (See Table 3).   
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Table 3: Number of Senior Officials in the World Bank Group by Country 
 
* Year represents the end of the World Bank's fiscal year 
** Total number of senior officials 
Source: data cited from (Shiratori 1993:234). Translated by the author. 
  
 As the Japanese government became increasingly aware of this problematic 
situation in the late 1980s, it began implementing various measures to increase Japanese 
representation within the multilateral development organizations. However, Japan’s 
representation continued to be unsatisfactory (Shiratori 1993:232-242). Thus, the 
government’s unsuccessful attempt to increase overall Japanese representation raised the 
importance of international knowledge contribution in the sphere of foreign aid as a more 
viable, immediately effective, alternative strategy of increasing Japan’s influence within 
the global community51. Overall, constructing the Japanese development model (the East 
Asian model) through the World Bank could be understood as Japan’s effort to contribute 
                                               
51 As additional attempts to increase its intellectual legitimacy, the Japanese government had been 
enthusiastically dispatching high ranking officials from the MOF to the World Bank in the late 1980s 
because the government viewed it as an alternative tool that could immediately increase Japan’s intellectual 
contribution within the World Bank which would in turn increase Japan’s status and respect within and 
beyond the institution (Awanohara 1995:163). 
Year* 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Nation Numbers Nation Numbers Nation Numbers Nation Numbers Nation Numbers Nation Numbers
1 USA 1,034 USA 1,004 USA 946 USA 934 USA 974 USA 1,087
2 UK 356 UK 341 UK 305 UK 302 UK 303 UK 350
3 India 258 India 269 India 252 India 255 India 264 India 306
4 France 207 France 220 France 201 France 203 France 209 France 229
5 Germany 128 Germany 124 Philippines 120 Philippines 118 Philippines 125 Philippines 146
6 Philippines 117 Philippines 122 Germany 108 Germany 108 Germany 112 Canada 129
7 Canada 105 Canada 109 Canada 103 Canada 106 Canada 106 Germany 126
8 Neitherland 79 Australia 80 Australia 75 Australia 78 Australia 83 Australia 92
9 Australia 77 Neitherland 79 Neitherland 68 Pakistan 70 Pakistan 71 Pakistan 76
10 Pakistan 70 Chile 67 Pakistan 65 Neitherland 64 Japan 62 Neitherland 72
11 Chile 68 Pakistan 62 Chile 62 Japan 61 Chile 61 Japan 69
12 Iran 62 Iran 58 Japan 61 Iran 61 Neitherland 61 Chile 62
13 Japan 58 Japan 52 Iran 61 Chile 60 Iran 60 Iran 62
14 Belgium 46 Argentina 44 Argentina 48 Argentina 47 Argentina 51 Argentina 57
15 Turkey 43 Turkey 43 Belgium 45 Belgium 43 China 48 Brazil 51
Total** 3,806 3,818 3,614 3,626 3,755 4,241
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its development knowledge, which was also intended to satisfy Japan’s political and 
diplomatic interests52.          
 Lastly, pressing needs for the Japanese state to communicate effectively with the 
outside world in the late 20th century also contributed to the shift in Japan’s foreign aid 
strategy, particularly the construction and promotion of the Japanese development model. 
Japanese state needed to address increasing external pressure coming from the 
Development Assistance Committee (the DAC) as well as IFIs such as the World Bank 
and the IMF to make Japanese foreign aid principles and practices more aligned with 
those of Western donors.  For example, the central development tool promoted by the 
Japanese government—yen loans— had long attracted criticism from Western donors due 
to their unique nature as bilateral loans with interest rather than grants that bore no 
responsibility for repayment. Japan’s great emphasis on yen loans was seen as the result 
of Japan advancing its own economic interests but not those of developing countries53. 
Meanwhile, Japan was not successful in convincing external critics about the 
effectiveness of its distinct development practices and its underlying development 
philosophy54. In this context, it was important for the Japanese state to clearly 
                                               
52 In the next chapter, I will discuss with more detail the intensity of the process of negotiation between the 
Japanese government and the World Bank over deciding the “correct” development model.  
53 According to Yasutomo (1995:13), “The lack of an official ‘philosophy,’ and the general and vague 
principles set forth by Foreign Ministry officials in the 1980s, left the ODA vulnerable to the charge that 
economic objectives constituted Japan’s sole reason for aid-giving. Therefore, in the 1990s, Japan unveiled 
its first official ODA philosophy.”  
54 Interestingly, Araki (1997b) reported that since the mid-1980s, there had been a general consensus within 
the Indonesian policy circle that Japan’s “software” aid (e.g. development related intelligence and training 
of staff, etc.) was one of the worst among the donor governments because Japan was only interested in 
providing money and “hardware” aid (e.g. infrastructure and machinery) and completely lacked knowledge 
transfer. Indonesian policy makers agreed that in comparison to the U.S. aid, which focused on 
disseminating its knowledge to the recipient countries, Japanese aid was “aid without brain” (Araki 
1997b:261-266 and 406-410). Such a harsh assessment of Japanese aid by the borrowing countries must 
have been a huge embarrassment for Japanese development officials, but more importantly, it demonstrated 
an urgent “need” for Japan to speak out to the outside world. On such occasions, Japanese aid bureaucrats, 
especially the ones who had an opportunity to interact with local officials of various recipient and donor 
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demonstrate to the outside world how its economic development tools, such as two-step 
loans, helped in the long-term economic development of the recipient country55. Most 
importantly, the Japanese state wanted to make a firm point that Japan’s development 
practices were indeed more effective than the ones promoted by Western donors—
particularly the U.S. in some circumstances— and that this was exemplified by the 
successful economic development of East Asia. In this context, the Japanese development 
model, which intended to help legitimize Japan’s distinct development practices globally, 
emerged 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 I conclude that material factors initially played an important role in driving 
Japan’s shift in foreign aid strategy. The signing of the Plaza Accord followed by the 
appreciation of the Japanese yen objectively changed the balance of power between 
Japanese private sector interests— it seemed to have empowered those interested in 
engaging in foreign direct investment abroad, particularly in Asia. This led to increased 
support for a specific kind of foreign aid (e.g. yen loans, including two-step loans by the 
OECF helped transfer Japanese multilateral businesses to Asia). The above material 
reality facing the Japanese state and private sectors drove a rapid and dramatic increase in 
Japanese foreign aid to Asia during the 1980s, which was essential for the development 
of the shift at an early stage. It also laid the foundation for the state’s political interests to 
emerge.           
                                                                                                                                            
governments learned of the importance of disseminating Japan’s own economic development knowledge 
globally. 
55 Enduring themes such as the meaning of Japan’s “economic cooperation,” its philosophy and how to 
communicate to the outside began to appear frequently in the publications of development bureaucracies 
beginning in the mid-1970s (OECF RQ 1974/16; OECF RQ 1975/19; OECF RQ 1975/20; OECF RQ 
1976/21). 
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 On the other hand, institutional and political factors were indispensable in 
explaining the latter shift of Japanese foreign aid strategy to promulgate the national 
model. Importantly, the gradual weakening of the business-driven structure of Japanese 
foreign aid, accompanied by key political changes, particularly the government’s 
increased involvement in multilateral development organizations, led to unintended 
institutional consequences—namely the reduction of the overriding power of the MITI 
and the increased importance of the MOF and the MOFA in the foreign aid sphere. The 
above processes helped state’s foreign aid discourse and strategy to shift (from MITI 
discourse/strategy that emphasized the promotion of Japanese business interests to 
MOF/MOFA discourse/strategy that emphasized state’s international legitimacy building 
through the medium of foreign aid). Lastly, Japan’s pressing need to establish legitimacy 
in the international aid sphere prompted the state to take autonomous action: 
promulgating the development model through the multilateral channel that would 
globally valorize and legitimize Japan’s distinct development practice.  
 Overall, I have shown that Japanese foreign aid strategy dramatically shifted in 
the 1980s due to a mixture of economic, institutional and political factors. In the next 
chapter, I will draw on constructivist political science theory to explore how the Japanese 
policy bureaucracy began to promote a particular set of economic ideas as “the East 
Asian model.”    
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CHAPTER 3 
Japan’s Challenge to the Washington Consensus and Making of the “East Asian 
Model” 
 
 
 In this chapter, I trace Japan’s policy making processes in challenging the 
Washington Consensus by focusing on the policy discourses during the 1980s and early 
1990s. My approach in this chapter is inspired by interdisciplinary literature on policy 
making, which suggests that ideational variables such as policy discourses and expert 
ideas “structure” actual material outcomes of state policy making (Hall 1992; King 1992; 
Weir 1992). I similarly argue that shared ideas among the Japanese developmental 
bureaucracy contributed to shaping the state’s foreign aid decision-making during the 
period.            
 I base my argument on a series of research quarterlies produced by the Overseas 
Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF), one of the key foreign aid bureaucracies that 
primarily handled overseas development loans including two-step loans (See Appendix B 
for my rationale for choosing the OECF over other bureaucracies). The OECF housed 
special expertise in development, particularly development related loans. It had direct ties 
to the field since many of the staff had been stationed abroad and had worked directly 
with the recipients and recipient governments. The OECF was under the direct 
supervision of the EPA and functioned as a subsidiary of the MOF. Officials from all four 
ministries often relied on OECF’s expert knowledge of development56.  
 OECF research quarterlies contain a combination of research papers, opinion 
pieces, memos, summaries and minutes from the major conferences, roundtable 
                                               
56 See (Söderberg 1996:56) 
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discussions and statistics on topics related to foreign aid, along with translations of major 
economic development reports (e.g. World Development Report, “WDR”) and various 
newspaper as well as short journal articles that could be of interest to bureaucrats (e.g. the 
Far-Eastern Economic Review). I also rely on the contents of OECF’s discussion papers 
as well as a 508 page-long historical volume produced by the OECF in 2003 that traces 
its 50 years of organizational history. Many of the contents from the OECF quarterly 
were written and prepared by OECF bureaucrats, while others were prepared by selected 
external researchers from major think tanks and Japanese academia. Such publications, in 
which bureaucratic development discourse was embedded, highlight the issues, interests 
and concerns of not only the institution of the OECF, but also of the Japanese 
development bureaucracy and the state at large. I will also integrate historical information 
from additional secondary and primary materials to provide more a contextualized 
background of Japan’s challenge.        
 Based on this analysis, I argue that not only the economic and political factors 
surrounding the Japanese state during the late 1980s, but also the state’s ideas about 
economic development which valued the central role of the state in fostering its economic 
development, were essential in instigating Japan’s construction and promotion of its own 
development model. Secondly, the research below suggests that the increasingly 
transnational nature of states’ policy-making environments as well as the globally 
available economic knowledge impacted states’ foreign aid decision-making at large. The 
East Asian model was indeed a product of global construction that drew on 
internationally available development ideas, constructed in the transnational 
organizational field (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer et al. 1997; Slaughter, 2004) and  
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involved both Japanese and international policy makers and scholars. Overall, I conclude 
that Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus was both a local and a global social 
construct, developed in the processes of interaction with other states and their actors, and 
drawing on internationally available economic ideas. 
 
THE RISE OF THE WASHINGTON CONSENSUS AND THE ROLE OF THE 
WORLD BANK 
 In the 1980s, the U.S.-led economic “Consensus” emerged which believed in the 
power of the free-market in optimizing economic growth, and advocated the need for 
market-liberalizing policies to reform the economies of developing countries. The end of 
the Cold War, the demise of Keynesianism and the rise of economic conservatism in the 
U.S. and U.K. (led by Ronald Regan and Margaret Thatcher) backed by an increased 
popularity of supply-side economics in the West drove the rise of this Consensus57 
(Awanohara 1995:166; Wade 1996:5).       
 The key policies of the Consensus (here after “the Washington Consensus”) 
included trade and financial liberalization, deregulation and various structural reforms to 
privatize state-owned industries. These policies were strongly endorsed by Washington-
based international financial institutions particularly the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (Williamson 1990:8-19). The World Bank’s rationale for 
adopting this new approach was that both economic theory and historical evidence 
demonstrated the failure of statist policies, such as import substitution policies, promoted 
in parts of Latin America and Africa during the 1970s and early 1980s. At the same time, 
there was political pressure coming from the Bank’s primary donor, the U.S. government, 
                                               
57 Many understood the end of the Cold War as historical evidence that statist policies had failed and 
liberalizing market forces were the ultimate alternative for the growth of developing economies. 
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to ally the Bank’s policies with those of the U.S. government (Babb 2009). In addition, 
many note the “Anglo-American” bias in the Bank’s approach which was greatly shaped 
by the ideas of economists with degrees from American and British universities which 
were increasingly influenced by the neoliberal economic theory (Stern and Ferreira 1997; 
Stiglitz 2002).                  
 For instance, in the 1980s, the World Bank began promoting newly established 
Structural Adjustment Loans whose disbursement was based on particular market-
liberalizing conditions that recipient countries were required to meet. These conditions 
conformed to the principal ideas of the Washington Consensus, such as minimizing the 
role of state, as well as opening developing countries’ economies to international markets 
as quickly and as much as possible.        
 Interestingly, the World Bank often referred to the positive development 
outcomes of the East Asian economies from the earlier decades as examples of neoliberal 
success. The East Asian economies’ openness to the international market, exemplified in 
its promotion of manufactured exports that targeted the international market, was often 
praised in the Bank’s annual reports (WDR 1979:15; WDR 1981:25). Their low levels of 
international debt, high domestic savings and good social indicators such as reduced rates 
of population growth, were also highlighted in these reports as positive characteristics of 
East Asian economies (WDR 1984:176 and 182). Across various reports, East Asia’s 
economic success was often compared to the economies of Latin America, which had 
been suffering from deepening debt and slow economic growth. By the early 1980s, the 
World Development Reports were actively reporting that Latin America’s failure was 
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partially due to long years of protectionist policies, such as import substitution policies58. 
As the 1981 World Development Report puts it:  
In the semi-industrial countries of East Asia, successful development has had two 
hallmarks: a supportive approach to increases in agricultural productivity and 
growth, along with readiness at an early stage to replace inward-looking import-
substitution policies with trade policies favoring the growth of exports in general 
and of manufactured exports in particular” (WDR 1981:25). 
 
In a similar vein, the 1985 report states,  
 
The difficulties encountered by many Latin American countries in the early 1980s 
contrast with the success of East Asian countries. Although outward-oriented 
policies did increase the Asian countries' exposure to external shocks, it also 
enabled them to capture the greater gains from international trade, so they grew 
faster (WDR 1985:55). 
 
 By the early 1990s, the economic experiences of the East Asia were clearly 
constructed as evidence of a neoliberal success story by the World Bank. According to 
this narrative, their developmental success was made possible by East Asian countries’ 
willingness to adopt particular structural reforms in order to open their economies to 
international market. As the World Development Report of 1990 summarizes,   
The successful East Asian countries have acted swiftly to stabilize their 
economies while pursuing gradual reform programs and maintaining a 
competitive exchange rate. The Republic of Korea, for example, pursued gradual 
but comprehensive trade reform during the late 1970s and 1980s. Indonesia 
supported its careful approach toward stable exchange rate management with 
reforms of the trade regime, the domestic regulatory framework, and the financial 
system. By contrast, most Latin American and Sub-Saharan African countries 
entered the decade with overvalued exchange rates that were sustained by high 
levels of protection and overborrowing. Direct export taxes, nontariff barriers, and 
quantitative controls on credit and investment were also common. Adjustments 
were often delayed and hesitant (WDR 1990:11-12). 
 
                                               
58 It is important to note that meanwhile a number of studies contradicted such findings (Singh 1985; Hughes and Singh 
1988; Amsden 1987). For example, Singh (1985) concludes that the Asian countries, particularly China and India, 
performed better than Latin American countries (Brazil and Mexico) precisely because that they had long followed the 
path of “self-reliance” and import-substitution industrialization.  
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 Below, I will show how this narrative of East Asia’s economic success 
constructed by the Bank was drastically different from the one adhered to by the Japanese 
developmental bureaucracy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. I further argue that the 
Japanese narrative of East Asian economic success was deliberately formulated in 
response to the dominant narrative of the Washington-based International Financial 
Institutions particularly the World Bank. I will begin by showing how differences in these 
economic narratives became apparent as the two primary institutions of developmental 
loans (the OECF and the World Bank) began forming a closer relationship in the foreign 
aid sphere in the late 1980s.   
 
THE OECF AND INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING  
 As Japan’s primary institution responsible for coordinating joint loans with 
multilateral development banks (MDBs), Japan’s Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund 
(OECF) began forming a closer working relationship with the World Bank in the 1980s. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, enhancing financial contribution to the MDBs, 
especially the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank became a strategic tool for 
the Japanese government during the 1980s. During this period, Japan’s co-financing with 
the World Bank dramatically increased and accounted for 46.5% of the Bank’s total co-
financing operations between 1984 and 1993 (Gyoten 1997:296). By 1984, Japan became 
the second largest shareholder of the Bank after the United States and the largest co-
financier of the Bank’s projects.       
 OECF’s Washington office was inaugurated in January 1980 and top officials 
including the vice-president of the World Bank attended the ceremony (OECF RQ 
1980/34:94). In 1987, the OECF established a new department dedicated exclusively to 
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communicating with the MDBs over co-financing (OECF RQ 1987/56:65). In addition to 
regular consultative meetings between the OECF and the World Bank, which had been 
taking place once a year in Washington or Tokyo since 1973, an annual mid-term review 
in Tokyo was added in 1989 (OECF 2003:51–64). These new arrangements provided 
increased opportunities for OECF bureaucrats to observe and learn about the Bank’s 
expertise as well as underlying institutional culture and politics.    
 OECF quarterlies during the period demonstrate the increasing ideological 
contribution provided by the bureaucrats who were dispatched to the key field offices 
around the world including Washington DC, Paris and Manila. These dispatched officers 
became a source of knowledge for the OECF, which was interested in taking an insider 
look at the organizational structure and policy prescriptions of the MDBs59. Not 
surprisingly, the bureaucrats not only brought back additional insights into the workings 
of these banks, but also increased an awareness of Japan’s “inferior” and less-respected 
position within these organizations and the international community at large. As they 
interacted more with personnel from the MDBs and other donor and recipient 
governments, they developed a wariness of the West, particularly the United States and 
its “Anglo-American” approach to development and diplomacy. OECF’s wariness toward 
the institutional culture of the World Bank, particularly with its domination by Anglo-
American political and ideological influence, became increasingly apparent in OECF 
reports of this period. For example, Kazumi Goto, a OECF bureaucrat temporarily 
                                               
59 The increasing amount of multilateral aid through channels such as the World Bank conveniently 
satisfied the Japanese government’s need to quickly increase the total amount of aid without enhancing its 
institutional capacity. That is because Japanese aid bureaucracies, particularly the OECF, had been 
suffering from limited staff and oversea offices to deal with drastic increase of foreign aid and its 
operations. In this context, Japan needed to quickly learn “know-how” from the World Bank through 
participating with the joint projects (Yanagihara and Emig 1991; Araki 1997b:244; Gyoten 1997:296).  
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dispatched to the Washington office, wrote a page-long, opinion piece in the Research 
Quarterly of 1984, titled “For Whom the Bell Tolls.” This piece sarcastically challenges 
the institutional culture of the World Bank by asserting that “The Anglo Saxon majority” 
in the Bank, made no secret of its low opinion of the “Japanese minority,” which it 
treated as “a bawdy crowd that disrupts order by splashing around its money” (OECF RQ 
1984/47:64, my translation).            
 At the same time, the OECF was becoming aware of the clear political influence 
of the largest donor, the U.S. government, over the World Bank’s policy making. In 1984, 
the OECF organized a special report covering U.S. foreign aid politics (OECF RQ 
1984/47). As a part of the report, OECF Washington office staff produced a paper that 
reviewed the rising influence of the Regan administration over the policies of the MDBs. 
The paper points particularly to the influence of “Reaganomics” over the World Bank 
and states that the “current President of the Bank60 is trying to convert the World Bank 
into the American bank” (OECF RQ 1984/47:64, my translation).  Meanwhile, 
interestingly the paper also provides a lesson for the Japanese government. The report 
highlights the need of Japanese government (as the second largest donor) to present clear 
policies and its own stance against the World Bank (OECF RQ 1984/47:64).  
 Furthermore, in 1987, five OECF officers along with Goto organized a study 
titled “The World Bank’s Aid Approach.” This report reveals OECF’s increasingly 
critical view of the Bank’s policy prescriptions. It states that  
 
 
 
                                               
60 Alden W. Clausen, the former President and CEO of Bank of America served as the President of the World 
Bank from 1981 to 1986. 
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Regarding matters with developing countries, [the Bank] not only acts very 
arrogantly and jumps to pure economic theories for the conclusion, but also often 
ends up providing unrealistic responses because it makes no effort to understand 
the underlying socio-political factors in recipient countries (OECF RQ 
1987/56:28, my translation).   
 
 The following issue features a roundtable discussion between OECF dispatched 
officers facilitated by OECF staff in Japan’s headquarters. In this report, an OECF 
official in Manila expresses his frustration toward the World Bank staff. He asserts,  
When we talk to people from the World Bank, we often feel dissatisfied with their 
explanations. . . .[At my last encounter with them,] the World Bank staff jokingly 
stated that “regarding tax reform, liberalization of imports, laws promoting new 
investments, lending policies toward industrial sector and so on, the Philippines 
follows 100% of the World Bank’s policy prescriptions while countries such as 
[South] Korea do not yet listen to us. In this sense, the Philippines is a model 
student.” I find some arrogance in this kind of statement (OECF RQ 
1987/57:158–159, my translation). 
 
 Regular interactions with policy makers from the recipient countries 
seemed to further confirm these OECF officials’ feeling of dissatisfaction with the 
Bank’s policies. It also generated a certain sense of pride and leadership among 
these professionals. The above comments continue below: 
On the other hand, when we talk with foreign bureaucrats such as the Philippines’ 
Vice Minister of Finance, they seem to share the similar [frustrated] feeling 
toward the Bank . . . . They are very interested in knowing whether Japanese 
economists with seasoned knowledge of Japan’s extraordinary development can 
provide policy assessments distinct from those offered by the Bank (OECF RQ, 
1987/57:158–159, my translation). 
 Lastly, in order to consolidate knowledge of its own development practice and to 
evaluate and possibly integrate new ideas and lessons from the outside world, the OECF 
began serious internal review, self-evaluation, institutional reform and upgrading in mid-
1980s. In 1984 and 1986, the president of the OECF, Taku Hosomi, launched private 
study groups to examine the future role of the OECF, particularly potential measures to 
build a more solid base and an effective structure for the growing institution. The 1986 
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study group contained 18 members including five academics and personnel from all four 
key ministries (the MOF, the MOFA, the MITI and the EPA). After eleven meetings 
between September 1986 and September 1987, the final report emphasized the 
importance of two-step loans as well as co-financing/joint loan operations (including 
SAL) with the World Bank.  
 Meanwhile, the roundtable discussion minutes attached to the final report 
demonstrate the much more nuanced opinions given by several key participants. Two 
participants suggested that it was important for the OECF to start building its own unique 
knowledge-driven projects instead of just blindly following the World Bank’s path by 
solely engaging with joint projects. They urged the OECF and the Japanese government 
“not only to provide money but also knowledge” (OECF RQ 1988/58:22-23)61.  
 Above, I have demonstrated that Japanese bureaucrats’ growing understanding of 
the role and economic ideology of the Washington Consensus played an important role in 
igniting their dissatisfaction with and doubtful sentiments of the World Bank. Moreover, 
transnational interactions among policy actors seemed to have influenced how Japanese 
bureaucrats thought of themselves as well as their responsibility as emerging leaders in 
international development. According to several studies, largely in the field of political 
                                               
61 Anne Emig, an American PhD student, who had closely observed these bureaucrats in the late 1980s, 
similarly argued that “By 1988-89, Japanese officials started talking about the need to ‘give money but also 
give advice’ (Okane o dasu kedo kuchi mo dasu). ‘Intellectual contribution’ (chiteki koken) became one of 
the buzzwords of Japanese aid policy. Having decided to speak up, the question for Tokyo became what to 
say and how to say it” (Emig 1999:47). In addition, Yasutomo (1995:Ch 3) demonstrated how the Japanese 
government began to focus on the disbursement of “ideas” rather than just money in the late 1980s. 
Yasutomo noted that during this period, “[Japan] “developed a sense of its ‘mission’ as the source of 
technology and knowledge for Asia, just as the advanced Western nations had served that function for 
Japan in the past” (1995:94). In accordance with this observation, Masaki Shiratori, one of the key 
development bureaucrats in Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus, expressed his view of Japan’s 
duty to the outside world in his 1993 publication, “As Japan has risen in position at the World Bank, 
Japan’s duty is to spread the experiences and development philosophies of Japan as well as the Asian 
Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) to developing countries through the channel of the World Bank” 
(Shiratori 1993:243).    
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science (Yasutomo 1995; Wade 1996; Terry 2002; Lee 2008), the Japanese bureaucracy 
developed an identity of rivalry against their U.S. counterpart in the late 1980s, which 
was also an important factor in Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus. Japanese 
bureaucrats’ assertiveness at the World Bank was clearly fueled by such an identity of 
rivalry along with their newly emerged confidence.  
          For the OECF, the 1980s was a period of sense-making. OECF officials also 
learned a great deal about institutional culture, philosophy and the workings of other 
partner organizations, especially the World Bank. In addition, outside voices such as the 
recipient countries’ and external partners’ assessments of Japanese economic aid made 
the OECF realize the importance of speaking out to the world through active means such 
as knowledge transfer. The 1980s was marked as a period of awakening for the Japanese 
development bureaucracy. 
 
THE CLASH OF DEVELOPMENT MODELS: STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 
LOANS VERSUS TWO-STEP LOANS 
 How did Japan’s fully fledged challenge of the World Bank’s Structural 
Adjustment Loans (SALs) come about?  Interestingly, until the late 1980s, despite their 
wariness toward the Bank’s policies as discussed above, the OECF did not have official 
reasons for publically challenging the World Bank’s policy prescription including SAL. 
The Japanese government had continued to support joint projects with the World Bank 
and to provide co-financing for some of its SAL loans (Ohno 2000:225)62. As Yasutomo 
(1995:70) states, despite the fact that Japan sought to acquire higher global status through 
                                               
62 Ohno (2000:225) also notes that that Japan was using the channel of multilateral development 
organizations such as the Bank to meet the goal of “capital recycling plan” –further disbursement of 
Japan’s surplus cash that was needed to be recycled as foreign aid. This was one of the important reasons 
why the Japanese government continued to support the Bank’s joint projects.   
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active involvement with the Bank, challenging the American position was not their goal. 
Japan considered the World Bank to be the “American bank,” and thus, treated it 
accordingly. However, this had begun to shift in the late 1980s, particularly following the 
episode in 1989 when the World Bank openly challenged Japan’s bilateral loan approach. 
 The real clash between Tokyo and Washington occurred in 1989, when the World 
Bank demanded the OECF modify its two-step loans. Japan’s long established two-step 
loans provided financing to recipient government’s local financial institutions which 
would in turn offer low-interest loans to targeted sectors such as small and medium 
enterprises and agricultural banks (Terry 1995; EPA 1996; Wade 1996; Terry 2002; 
OECF 2003; Okuda 2004). The two-step loan was modeled after Japan’s own postwar 
development experience (as a loan recipient of the World Bank63) and was the central 
lending instrument of the ASEAN-Japan Development Fund, established in 1987. The 
OECF administered the fund and the Japanese government had pledged to give more than 
$2 billion over three years to promote the development of the private sector in ASEAN 
countries (OECF RQ 1988/61:150-151; EPA 1996:268; Wade 1996:7–8; Gyoten 
1997:298; OECF 2003:56).        
 Ultimately, a senior vice president of the World Bank sent a letter to the president 
of the OECF urging him to reconsider OECF’s policy on two-step loans in the 
Philippines. The Bank argued that such loans with subsidized below market-interest rates 
disrupted financial sector reforms initiated by the World Bank and IMF’s structural 
adjustment programs in the region. It stated that if Japan (the OECF) did not remove its 
interest rate subsidies, World Bank support from the Philippines would be withdrawn 
(Terry 1995; Wade 1996; Terry 2002; Okuda 2004). This event shocked the OECF as 
                                               
63 See Shiratori (1993:225-228). 
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well as the Japanese government, and they understood the above letter as a direct threat to 
their institutional authority and national sovereignty. Japanese officials were deeply 
offended by the lack of respect and insignificant treatment of the Japanese government by 
the Bank’s top official despite Japan’s substantial financial contribution to the Bank.
 Most importantly, the clash highlighted fundamental ideological differences 
between Japan’s and the U.S.’s approaches to economic development64. The Bank 
believed in a development strategy that embraced principles of free markets exemplified 
in structural adjustment loans while the Japanese government believed in the strategy of 
guided markets, including guiding financial markets through the use of two-step loans 
(Wade 1996:8). More specifically, the World Bank’s structural adjustment loans were 
based on and shaped by the theoretical belief that the market mechanism was the most 
efficient means of allocating resources. Thus the recipient countries were conditioned on 
particular market-liberalizing policy reforms. In contrast, OECF’s two-step loans were 
for financing particular industries and development projects with government guidance 
and support. They were premised on the idea that in developing countries, especially in 
earlier stages of development, markets alone functioned inefficiently; therefore, 
government policies were necessary to facilitate better resource allocation—for example, 
through subsidizing loans to specific industries in targeted sectors (Okuda 1993:67–68). 
Such subsidized credit schemes, as promoted by Japanese two-step loans, were directly 
opposing to the kinds of market-liberalizing policy reforms that World Bank was trying 
                                               
64 Many observe that there were rising feelings of discontent and skepticism among Japanese policy makers 
and their intellectual contributors about the dominance of the theoretically-oriented, market-centered 
development prescription promoted by a group of neoliberal economists at the Bank (Gyoten 1997; Terry 
2002; Akiyama et al. 2003:128; Nishigaki et al. 2003:64; Okuda 2004). Gyoten (1997:301) asserts, “The 
Japanese, especially government officials, though some what attracted by the (neo-liberal) thesis, in 
principle, remained under Keynesian influence because the thesis seemed too abstract and incompatible 
with reality. They also doubted the value of complete laissez faire.”  
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to promote in the recipient countries65.  In short, the development ideology of the 
Washington Consensus promoted by the Bank came into direct conflict with the Japanese 
idea of “guided markets” (Wade 1996:8-9), which focused on the central role of 
government in early stages of a nation’s economic development.    
 In October 1991, in response to the above challenge, the OECF published an 
occasional paper in English titled “Issues Related to the World Bank’s Approach to 
Structural Adjustment: Proposal from a Major Partner.”  Given its institutional history, 
the OECF housed experts in “guided markets” and two-step loans66. This was the first of 
such papers published by the OECF in its thirty-year history, and the paper clearly stated 
that “responsibility of its content lies within the OECF” (OECF RQ 1992/73:5). Inserting 
such a note of ownership of the argument is remarkably rare within the history of OECF 
publication. Renowned Japanese academics contributed to the preparation of the paper67   
 According to Gyoten (1997:300), the paper offered five principle arguments: (1) 
the insufficiency of the liberalizing market and the importance of investment promotion 
through targeting industries, (2) the importance of protecting infant industries and 
promoting prospective export sectors to reduce the cost of rapid trade liberalization in 
developing countries, (3) the need to acknowledge the limitation of market mechanisms 
                                               
65 Scholars using political economy perspective would argue that the U.S. government, through pressuring 
the World Bank to take on SAL, carried out its own economic interests. Indeed, U.S. multinationals were 
doing poorly compared with Japanese ones, and were pressuring the state to more actively engage in 
foreign aid to meet their economic interests abroad. I acknowledge such material factors contributed to the 
development of the conflict. However, my aim here is to highlight the clear ideological differences existing 
between the two sides which could have further accelerated the conflict and eventually could have given 
the Japanese government a reason for coming up with its own development “model” to challenge the model 
of the Washington Consensus.      
66 Ironically, most loans provided by the World Bank to Japan in the postwar era took the shape of two-step 
loans and were distributed primarily through the OECF (Shiratori 1993:225-228).   
67 Discussions from a study group on the Structural Adjustment Approach founded in June 1991, laid the 
foundations for the report. The group was comprised of top academic experts in Japan (Shujiro Urata of 
Waseda University, Hidenobu Okuda of Hitotsubashi University, Akiyoshi Horiuchi of Tokyo University 
and Toru Yanagihara of Hosei University and OECF officials (Yasutami Shimomura and Keiichi Tango) 
(See Ohno and Ohno 1998:61).  
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in providing the optimal allocation of resources (“market failure”) especially in 
developing countries where the financial market is often incomplete, (4) criticisms of the 
World Bank’s universal approach and promotion of a more country-specific approach to 
development, and  (5) the significance of the lessons drawn from Japanese postwar 
experiences especially fiscal and monetary policies such as preferential tax treatment and 
lending through development finance institutions.       
 Overall, the report emphasizes the importance of active industrial policy in 
compensating the private sector. It asserts: 
It is too optimistic to expect that industries to sustain the economy of the next 
generation well come up automatically through the activities of the private sector. 
Some measures for fostering industry are required. As pointed out from time to 
time, industrial policy was adopted as a central measure in the economic 
development strategies in East Asia. On the other hand, while the World Bank is 
aware of the importance of export industries and supporting outward oriented 
development strategies, its structural adjustment approach seems to lack the long-
term viewpoint of how to develop such industries, perhaps because it assumes that 
activities of the private sector will attain this goal. This lack is very regrettable 
(OECF RQ 1992/73:14). 
 
The paper was officially presented at the annual World Bank and Japan meeting in 
November 1991(OECF RQ 1992/73:5; Terry 2002:301). This was the most direct 
criticism of the World Bank’s core development approach expressed by the OECF 
backed by the Japanese government.        
 Finally, it is important to note that unearthing, gathering and articulating 
knowledge regarding the uniqueness of Japan’s postwar development experience had 
been an ongoing effort organized by Japanese development bureaucracies a few years 
prior to 1991. One of the key initiatives that was held between the late 1980s and the 
mid-1990s was MOF’s “benkyokai” (study group) on the uniqueness of Japan’s 
development philosophies. In addition to MOF officials, members included renowned 
 
 
 
69 
Japanese economists and researchers. The study group was chaired by Shigeru Ishikawa, 
an influential Japanese development economist who had held an enduring interest in the 
topic since the early 1970s. Another key member was Toru Yanagihara, a young leading 
researcher at an influential Japanese think-tank, the Institute of Developing Economies. 
He was also a member of the committee that drafted OECF’s 1991 occasional paper 
(OECF RQ, 1992/73:5). According to Terry (2002:303-304), “[a]s time went on, 
Yanagihara became increasingly obsessed with carrying on Ishikawa’s mission, which he 
saw as establishing a new set of strategic prescriptions for developing countries, based on 
the Japanese model.” For instance, at a 1989 symposium on “Issues of Structural 
Adjustment in Asian Countries and the Future of Economic Cooperation,” Yanagihara 
made a passionate call for the explicit construction and promotion of such a model, 
arguing that,  
There must have been a “framework” behind Japan’s success in economic 
development. However, until today, [Japan] has not built such a “framework” into 
a clear concept of a development model. Unless and until we build such a model, 
the World Bank’s central role in economic development thinking will not change 
(OECF RQ 1989/62:129, my translation).  
 
The ideological contribution of these two figures in the production of OECF’s 1991 paper 
as well as the subsequent construction of the Japanese version of the East Asian Model 
was significant.         
 In the continuing efforts to gather concrete evidence of the Japanese model and its 
applicability toward Asia, a number of international symposiums and workshops were 
organized by the OECF and its supervising agencies. In March 1992, the OECF 
sponsored a symposium for its 30th anniversary titled “The Experience of East Asian 
Economic Development.” Vice presidents from the OECF and the World Bank were both 
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present, and respected researchers from Japan, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan were invited 
to share their experiences. The symposium was organized around two sessions examining 
each country’s evidence of two main components of the Japanese model: (1) policy-based 
finance and (2) industrial policy particularly focusing on the country’s export promotion 
policies.          
 During the first session on policy-based finance, after listening to four case 
studies from Japan, Korea, Thailand and Taiwan on their distinct experiences, Johannes 
Linn, Vice president of the World Bank expressed his disagreement, questioning 
“whether large-scale policy guided finance combined with a considerable amount of 
subsidies is really an element necessary for the success of developmental strategy” and 
asked “whether policy guided finance can be harmful in any ways” (OECF RQ 
1992/75:13-14, my translation). In response, Sadao Amano, the Board Director of the 
OECF asserted that,  
Despite the generally amicable and cooperative relationship between the OECF 
and the World Bank up to now, one area of exception is the issue of policy-based 
finance. The OECF firmly believes in the effectiveness of such policy and our 
position is to actively promote it to the outside world (OECF RQ 1992/75:15, my 
translation). 
 
By this point, the OECF was clearly promoting a different version of the East Asian 
development story, which was completely at odds with the story told at the World Bank. 
The World Bank’s position was that East Asia became economically successful because 
it followed a neoliberal prescription—private sector growth driven by the free-market. On 
the other hand, the Japanese side argued that such economic success was possible 
because of the government’s guidance evidenced in policy-based finance and industrial 
policy.             
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 The January 1993 issue of OECF Research Quarterly contained an important 
report organized by Kazumi Goto, who had previously criticized the World Bank’s 
Anglo-Saxon bureaucratic culture during the 1980s. This time, he was stationed in 
OECF’s London office, and from there he networked and collected responses from 
U.K.’s development experts on OECF’s 1991 occasional paper criticizing the World 
Bank’s structural adjustment loans. The publication was titled “The Intellectual 
Awakening of a Sleeping Partner: Some Comments from the U.K. on OECF’s View of 
Structural Adjustment” and contained a critical introductory essay by Goto followed by 6 
responses from the following U.K. intellectuals and policy experts: John Toye, Robert 
Cassen, Paul Mosley, John Howell, David Stanton and John Flemming. Despite some 
disagreements, the majority of the essays supported the central arguments made by 
OECF’s paper. However, what was most intriguing in this report was Goto’s attempt to 
refine the concept of the Japanese model by adding ideas from other foreign scholars. In 
addition to citing the work of a variety of Japanese economists, the report thoroughly 
reviewed Chalmers Johnson’s well-known concept of the “developmental state model” 
and demonstrated its significance in understanding East Asia’s development experiences. 
Goto commented that “An important point provided by [Johnson’s] research is that . . . . 
government-driven policy interventions do not always fail, in contrast to neoclassical 
economists’ tendency to make the role of government as small as possible.” (OECF RQ 
1993/76:166, my translation). He concluded that such research could provide an 
empirical ground for OECF’s criticisms of structural adjustment loans.  
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THE MAKING OF THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE STUDY 
 
 At the same time, OECF’s foremost supervising ministry, the Ministry of Finance, 
particularly its International Finance Bureau68 had also been putting pressure on the 
World Bank to take on a large-scale study of East Asian development experiences and the 
uniqueness of its development model. The MOF was aware of Japan’s strategically 
important position within the Bank (it was the second largest shareholder since 1984) and 
was not hesitant to use its influence. For instance, in the annual meeting of the board of 
governors of the World Bank and the IMF in October 1991, just two months before the 
OECF presented its occasional paper on structural adjustment69, Yasushi Mieno, head of 
the Bank of Japan, announced70, 
Experiences in Asia have shown that although development strategies require a 
healthy respect for market mechanisms, the role of the government cannot be 
forgotten. I would like to see the World Bank and the IMF take the lead in a 
wider-ranging study that would define the theoretical underpinnings of this 
approach and clarify the areas in which it can be successfully applied to other 
parts of the globe (also cited in Wade 1996; Gyoten 1997:301; Terry 2002:263-
264).  
 
 Perhaps, the Japanese side’s understanding was that unless and until such a 
development approach was officially constructed and legitimated by an influential and 
“neutral” third party such as the World Bank, its model would not become credible and 
                                               
68 Terry explains that “the OECF was considered an organ of the MOF” (2002:293). The MOF maintained 
powerful influence over the OECF and its yen loan operations. Moreover, MOF’s International Finance 
Bureau dealt exclusively with issues related to the MDBs. According to Yanagihara and Emig (1991:55), 
“It (International Finance Bureau) has constant communications and negotiations with its counterparts in 
other advanced countries and is always cognizant of Japan’s responsibilities in international financial 
affairs. Since 1982, the debt problem of the less-developed countries has been one of the most pressing 
concerns for the bureau.” Institutionally, a president of the OECF was generally recruited from retired high-
ranking MOF officials that also reinforced their institutional proximity (Yanagihara and Emig 1991:57).  
69 According to Wade (1996), the Japanese side was aiming to circulate the occasional paper widely at this 
Annual Meeting; however, the committee could not reach a final consensus before October 1991. Thus it 
was presented at the November meeting between the Bank and Japan instead.     
70 Yasushi Mieno,“Statement by the Alternate Governor of the Bank and Fund for Japan,” Summary 
Proceedings, Forty-Six Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors, 1991 (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, 1991), P67.  
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universally accepted by the international community. It would also help the process of 
propagating the model globally.  
 Two high-ranking officials from the Japanese development bureaucracy, Masaki 
Shiratori and Isao Kubota71, played a central role in pressuring the World Bank (Wade 
1996; Terry 2002; Okuda 2004) to take on the study.  Between 1989 and 1992, Shiratori 
was an executive director for Japan at the World Bank in Washington, and he played a 
critical role in the Bank’s decision to publish a highly controversial internal study in 1992 
on the industrial strategies of several Asian countries72. Kubota was the managing 
director of the OECF dealing with its loan coordination with the Bank and the main 
organizer of the OECF occasional paper of 1991.      
 Both Shiratori and Kubota used their key positions to ultimately convince the 
World Bank to take on the East Asian Miracle study (Wade 1996; Terry 2002:293; 
Shibata and Ejiri 2008:4). In the fall of 1990, with Shiratori’s leadership, Japan created 
the Policy and Human Resource Development (PHRD) Fund within the Bank with an 
annual contribution of approximately 20 billion Yen ($200 million) to finance the study 
(Shiratori 1993:230-231; Terry 2002:262-263). Previously, other countries had created 
similar trust funds within the Bank, but none have surpassed the scale of PHRD. Terry 
states, “The unspoken understanding was that these (PHRD Fund) would go to raise the 
stature of the Japanese within the institution” (Terry 2002:263). In the subsequent years, 
the fund also supported the Bank’s additional initiatives that aimed to demonstrate the 
                                               
71 Shiratori and Kubota had both had graduated from Tokyo University Law Faculty and had 2 years of 
overseas economic training (dispatched by the bureaucracy) at Columbia University and Oxford University 
respectively. They had been pursuing long successful, elite-careers in the MOF, and from there, they 
navigated back and forth between the MOF and key positions in other agencies such as the OECF (Wade 
1996: footnote 7 and 10; Terry 2002).  
72 The study acknowledged the success of government intervention and suggested better integration of these 
policy lessons to support other countries’ development (Awanohara 1995:170). 
 
 
 
74 
uniqueness of Japan’s and East Asia’s development models73. In addition to Japan’s full 
provision of the cost of the research, Japan agreed that if the Bank took on the research, 
Japanese Board members would cease to oppose “Operational Directive on Financial 
Sector Operations” drafted by the Bank, which urged financial deregulation on a full 
scale (Wade 1996:17-18).        
 Lawrence Summers, then the chief economist of the Bank and Nancy Birdsall, the 
director of the Policy Research Department, supervised the construction of the report. 
According to Terry (2002:301), despite Summers’ skepticism of the quality of Japanese 
economists and economic thoughts74, Summers interestingly demonstrated enthusiasm 
toward the project from the beginning; he actually visited Japan a few months after the 
presentation of OECF’s 1991 occasional paper on structural adjustment loans and met 
with several key architects of the paper including Isao Kubota to discuss the possibility of 
further research. Regarding the Miracle project, Summers and Birdsall appointed John 
Page, a former associate professor at Princeton, to head the research team which 
consisted of famous PhD economists largely from American universities including 
Joseph Stiglitz, W. Max Corden, Robert Z. Lawrence, Richard Sabot, Peter Petri, and 
                                               
73 PHRD Fund also financed “The Brain Trust Program” which was established in 1990 (and lasted until 
2007) and entrusted to the World Bank Institute (WBI). The program’s “principal objective were first to 
conduct studies on the management experience of Japan and East Asian development, and second, to share 
the lessons of that experience with developing and transitional economies” (Shibata and Ejiri 2008:4). The 
program funded research, workshops and various dissemination activities and published 13 books and 54 
working papers which have been translated into multiple languages. Some of the titles of these publications 
include, but are not limited to “The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and 
Transforming Economies (1995) edited by Masahiko Aoki and Hugh Patrick , “Corporate Governance in 
Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks” (1995) edited by Masahiko Aoki and 
Hyung-Ki Kim, “The Japanese Civil Service and Economic Development: Catalyst of Change” (1995) 
edited by Hyung-Ki Kim, Michio Muramatsu, T. J. Pempel and Kozo Yamamura, “The Role of 
Government in East Asian Economic Development: Comparative Institutional Analysis” (1997) edited by 
Masahiko Aoki, Hyung-Ki Kim, and Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and  “Rethinking the East Asian Miracle” 
(2001) edited by Joseph Stiglitz and Shahid Yusuf.   
74 According to Wade (1996:10), Summers was known for his tactlessness and openly held the view that 
Japanese economists were “second rate.”   
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Howard Pack (Wade 1996:17-18; Terry 2002:264-267). Some Japanese intellectuals such 
as Ishikawa and Yanagihara were asked to provide some input for the study through the 
means of internally organized seminars and papers; however, the core research team did 
not include any Japanese scholars or specialists on the Asian economy (Terry 2002:267-
268). Despite the lack of representation, the publication of the East Asian Miracle by the 
Bank’s Anglo-Saxon team seemed to have met underlying national interests of the 
Japanese government to a large degree. As Terry (2002:276) states,  
[T]he World Bank had not only endorsed the Japanese model, it invented it, with 
internal Bank politics serving as midwife. In 1993, except for Ishikawa Shigeru, 
no Japanese policy makers or academic had successfully delivered a general 
theory linking Japanese and East Asian patterns of development. Ishikawa’s work 
was mostly conducted in policy seminars and through papers with circulation 
limited to the MOF and seminar participants. . . . The [East Asian Miracle] report 
had accepted that the Japanese model was different from the Anglo-American 
model, and that other developing economies might learn from Japan’s experience. 
For the Japanese, this was a breakthrough.  
 
 Despite the fact that the above project met underlying interests of the Japanese 
government, for many of the Japanese developmental bureaucrats and intellectuals who 
were heavily and emotionally invested in the process and had high hopes for the above 
project, the actual content of the final report was a great disappointment. Subject to 
strong institutional political pressures to align with the Bank’s overall “market-friendly” 
message, the final report was at best “ambiguous” and did not acknowledge the central 
message of the model that the Japanese side wanted to advocate: the important role of 
government in East Asian development and the effectiveness of Japanese style industrial 
policy (Wade 1996; Shiratori 1998; Terry 2002; Okuda 2004;).  
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OECF’S RESPONSE 
 In December 1993, immediately following the release of the Miracle Report, the 
OECF co-sponsored a symposium with the World Bank to review and express their 
repudiation of the report. The 195 page-long discussion paper organized by newly 
established Research Institute of Development Assistance (RIDA)75 of the OECF 
demonstrates OECF’s pressing efforts to defend its version of the East Asian Miracle 
story by gathering intellectual contribution from overseas. The study was organized 
around the “East Asian Miracle follow-up survey” initiated and implemented by the 
RIDA following the symposium.        
 The survey collected various opinions of 29 prominent intellectuals and policy 
experts from the U.K., U.S., and Asia over the contentious issues of the Miracle study 
which emerged in the symposium. Participants for the survey were asked to respond to 
OECF’s short issue paper, which was prepared after this symposium. Some of these 
foreign contributors included well-known critics of the Washington Consensus and of 
neoliberal interpretations of East Asian development such as Ha-Joon Chang, Robert 
Wade, Paul Mosley, Tony Killick and Yale development economist Gustav Ranis. Asian 
participants represented a great number of countries including China, Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand.  
                                               
75 The OECF founded RIDA in 1993 in order to further investigate and strategize Japan’s development 
policies and ideologies—and, more importantly, to propagate them to the outside world (OECF JDA, 
1994/1-1; OECF 2003:59). The Institute began publishing its own Journal of Development Assistance 
(JDA)—an elaborated version of OECF Research Quarterly. Although JDA was in Japanese, RIDA 
published a number of discussion papers in English, which was an unprecedented initiative. Discussion 
papers (OECF DP) introduced Asian case studies that demonstrated evidence supporting Japan’s version of 
the East Asian Miracle story. Some of the titles of these reports include “Government Responsibilities in 
the Telecommunications Sector” (March 1994), “Policy-Based Directed Credit Programs in the Philippines” 
(January 1995), “The Role of the Government and the Response of the Private Sector: The Pattern of 
Development in the Republic of Korea and Thailand” (July 1995). Above all, the paper published in 
August 1995, titled “The World Bank’s East Asian Miracle Report: Its Strengths and Limitations,” became 
the ultimate source for OECF’s challenge of the Bank’s version of the East Asian Miracle story. 
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 The actual report consists of two parts: part 1 containing four essays by OECF’s 
key bureaucrats summarizing and assessing the survey findings, and part 2 consisting of 
original commentaries from the 29 surveys. The preface expresses deep appreciation to 
Hans Singer (a prominent British development economist), Alice Amsden (who was 
known for her work on South Korea’s late industrialization) and Shigeru Ishikawa (an 
influential Japanese development economist, and one of the leading proponents of the 
Japanese development model and its relevance in Asia as discussed earlier). All three had 
been invited to give seminars at the OECF in the early 1990s (OECF DP 1995 no.7: ii). 
 The first chapter by Masaki Shiratori, a key architect of the Miracle Report, and 
then Vice President of the OECF, discusses the central problems which had emerged 
from the overall survey of the World Bank’s Miracle Report, particularly its shallow and 
inconclusive exploration of four key areas of the model. The areas listed were: (1) role of 
the government in economic development, (2) the effectiveness of industrial policy, (3) 
the institutional dimensions of economic development, and (4) the replicability of East 
Asian experiences (OECF DP 1995 no.7: 8). Clearly, the collection of surveys was 
advocating the Japanese story of the East Asian model on behalf of the Japanese 
themselves. After reviewing each of the above issues in detail, Shiratori asserts,  
The forgoing review reveals that the majority of the opinions support the positive 
role of government not only in getting the fundamentals right, but also in charting 
a development course, changing policies with pragmatic flexibility when they 
appear ineffective, and shaping an institutional basis for effective policy 
implementation (OECF DP 1995 no.7: 13). 
 
Furthermore, he concludes by highlighting the importance of a case-by case approach to 
development that challenges the “universal” approach promoted by the Washington 
Consensus model. This was also one of the main criticisms raised in 1991’s occasional 
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paper on structural adjustment loans. Shiratori states, “The replicability of some 
successful elective intervention in East Asia should be assessed case by case, rather than 
generally. A country-specific approach is needed to take into account the initial condition, 
circumstance and history of each developing country” (OECF DP 1995 no.7:13).  The 
second chapter by Kazumi Goto and third chapter by Izumi Ohno from the RIDA 
summarize and assess the key arguments from the survey from the U.K. and Asia 
respectively. Goto concludes by pointing out the methodological shortcomings of the 
Miracle Report such as the study’s theoretical bias due to the dominant ideological 
influence of neoclassical economists at the Bank. He calls for a more balanced approach 
beyond the dichotomous policy debates between ‘government or market’ (OECF DP 
1995 no.7:33-38). The final chapter by Chikao Tsukuda, a senior vice president of the 
OECF provides a different essay compared the above three—a piece that analyzes the 
East Asian Miracle based on historical, political, economic and institutional perspectives 
which he found missing from the Bank’s Miracle Report. Tsukuda emphasizes the 
importance of the role of national institutions and active provision of physical 
infrastructure in guiding East Asian economic development. Both Tsukuda and Shiratori 
argue that building strong and competent institutions could be an important factor that 
other developing countries could learn from East Asia. They lamented that the Bank’s 
report did not adequately cover such an aspect of the East Asian model (OECF DP 1995 
no.7). 
 Thus, the vision of the East Asian model that emerged from OECF reports was 
one that promoted the active role of government in organizing sector-specific policies 
(e.g. provision of subsidized loans and assistance in building local financial institutions 
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and the physical infrastructure of the country). This allowed East Asian countries to 
respond flexibly to emerging economic opportunities and shifting environments. It was 
founded on the idea that especially at the early stages of countries’ development, when 
they lack sufficiently-developed markets, the government needed to play a central role in 
improving the market and institutional frameworks to support the state’s industrial 
development.          
 An interesting theoretical addition to this model was its emphasis on “multiple 
recipes/lessons” learned from East Asian development experiences. OECF’s publication 
repeatedly asserted that because of the different stages of development that each country 
experiences, there is not a single economic recipe that fits all developing countries. In 
another OECF report, Shiratori eloquently condemns the World Bank and the IMF for 
their “universal panacea” approach: 
We should provide policy advice depending on each country’s varying initial 
condition because I think that Japan and East Asia hold multiple experiences. In 
contrast, neoclassical academics claim that “such experiences are just an 
accumulation of anecdotes and are not representative of a universal model.” 
However, I believe that neoclassical theory itself . . . only applies to an extremely 
exceptional development stage where market mechanisms function completely. A 
clean mathematical model does not mean universality. Economic development / 
transition to market economy are lengthy processes that require not only a 
transformation of the economy but of the entire social structure of the country. In 
such circumstances, there is no room for applying the “universal panacea 
approach” which neoclassical theorists preach. Yet, only accumulating the 
experiences of Japan and East Asia without having universality is problematic as 
we consider the possibility of transferability. . . . thus “our next step is to organize 
and systematize such experiences and clearly adopt them as pragmatic principles 
for Japan’s development aid while transmitting them to the outside world in 
English” (OECF JDA 1995/2–4: 134–136, my translation). 
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CONCLUSION 
 In this chapter, we have seen that not only the economic and political factors 
surrounding the Japanese state in the 1980s and early 1990s, but also its ideas that valued 
the central role of the state in fostering national economic and financial development at 
its early stage: the Japanese ideas of “guided markets,” were essential in instigating 
Japan’s construction and promotion of its own development model challenging the 
Washington Consensus. At the same time, the ideas became important for the Japanese 
state in a particular historical context defined by the rise of Washington Consensus in the 
late 20th century. In other words, if there had been no Washington Consensus emanating 
its version of the East Asian economic success story, the Japanese state would never have 
needed to construct and propagate its own version of the Miracle Story.  
 Secondly, despite the fact that the challenge appeared to have emerged “locally” 
based on Japan’s “indigenous” knowledge of economic development, it was indeed an 
outcome of global construction. Japanese policy makers not only embraced the ideas of 
Japanese scholars, but also drew on the ideas of prominent scholars from around world in 
order to justify the Japanese version of the Miracle Story. Importantly, the idea that 
markets worked imperfectly in developing countries, requiring high levels of state 
intervention, was a prominent argument of postwar development economics in the U.S. 
and U.K. It is not coincidental that leading British development economist, Hans Singer 
was invited to give seminars at the OECF in the early 1990s and prominently appeared in 
OECF’s 1995 publication. Moreover, although the East Asian model also drew on the 
ideas of Japanese development experts, these “indigenous positions” were themselves 
heavily influenced by traffic with foreign ideas. For instance, two key Japanese 
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economists who provided the foundational ideas for the East Asian model— Shigeru 
Ishikawa and his successor, Toru Yanagihara—both held PhDs from U.S. universities 
(Cornell and Princeton, respectively). Ishikawa had taught at Harvard and written 
extensively in English while Yanagihara was a polyglot who spoke five languages (Terry 
2002:98 and 303). Both Yanagihara and Ishikawa were also heavily influenced by 
Marxist ideas at the early stages of their careers. Similarly, the development bureaucrats 
who played the central role in the challenge, Masaki Shiratori from the MOF and Isao 
Kubota from the OECF received a few years of economics training abroad (sent and 
financed by the Japanese government), attending Columbia and Oxford, respectively. I 
argue that all of them uniquely represented “hybrid economic knowledge 
embracers/producers” in the Japanese developmental policy making sphere.  
 There are two major lessons we can draw from this. First, it is clear that “ideas” 
are important factors in economic aid policy making because powerful states and 
institutional actors can construct their own interpretations/versions of economic 
narratives drawing from the same facts. These narratives may be used to promote states’ 
own material (economic and political) interests in the field of foreign aid, but more 
importantly these ideas could uniquely structure foreign aid policy making of the donor 
countries. Secondly, economic aid policy making does not only happen within the 
boundary of the nation-state. Increasingly, the transnational characteristics of states’ 
policy making environments, globally available economic knowledge as well as the 
active involvement of policy actors who can embrace/produce hybrid economic 
knowledge together impact states’ aid decision-making at large. As shown in the case of 
the Japanese development bureaucracy, interactions between transnational networks of 
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policy makers/bureaucrats, and scholarly experts shaped the actual challenge—from the 
early phases of OECF’s institutional learning to the construction of the East Asian model. 
The East Asian model was indeed a product of global construction that drew on 
internationally available development ideas, constructed in the transnational 
organizational field (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Meyer et al. 1997; Slaughter 2004) 
involving both Japanese and international policy makers and scholars. Overall, I conclude 
that Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus was both a local and a global social 
construct, developed in the processes of interaction with other states and their actors, and 
drawing on internationally available economic ideas. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Conclusion 
 
 Since Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus in the early 1990s, a 
number of factors underlying Japanese economy and foreign aid have changed.  After 
becoming a top donor in 1989, Japan maintained its position between 1991 and 2000. 
However, the deepening economic recession at home led to gradual decline in the total 
amount of Japanese foreign aid since the late 1990s (Ohno 2005:168; Lancaster 
2007:129). These studies also reveal Japan’s lack of assertiveness in the international aid 
sphere beginning in the same period. According to Ohno (2005:168-170), various 
domestic institutional factors contributed to Japan’s “silence.” These include namely the 
government’s increasingly inward-oriented thinking accompanied by its administrative 
and financial reforms and its continuing aid management problems, which were largely 
caused by the decentralized system of Japanese foreign aid (particularly the separation 
between planning, budgeting and implementation of aid).        
 In contrast, Japan’s effort to disseminate its development model/knowledge 
globally through the medium of the World Bank continued into the 21st century. The 
Japanese government founded and financed research initiatives such as “The Brain Trust 
Program76” through the World Bank Institute (WBI) and extended its networking among 
the senior levels within the Bank (Terry 2002:Ch 6). According to Terry (2002:238), 
since the Japanese challenge in the early 1990s, “The World Bank had not only endorsed 
the East Asian and Japanese models but had also become Japan’s strongest ally against 
the U.S.-inspired policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).” For instance, the 
                                               
76 See footnote 74 of Chapter 3 for details. 
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Asian financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated this transformed relationship between the 
Bank and the Japanese government. In the aftermath of the crisis, two key figures from 
each institution, Eisuke Sakakibara from Japan’s Ministry of Finance and Joseph Stiglitz, 
the then chief economist at the Bank, launched a campaign against the IMF. They argued 
that the neoliberal prescriptions imposed by the IMF on a number of Asian countries in 
the earlier decades ultimately drove these countries into the massive financial crisis of 
1997. Sakakibara and Stiglitz warned of the danger of market-fundamentalism within the 
IMF and advocated for its reform. They also suggested that the government could play an 
important role in effectively facilitating country’s early development processes 
(Sakakibara 2000; Stiglitz 2002; Terry 2002:Ch 6).           
 Overall, I conclude that Japan’s challenge to the institutional legitimacy and 
development ideology of the Washington Consensus in the late 20th century was a 
historically significant event, because it was the first time that the prescription and 
legitimacy of the Washington Consensus was explicitly contested by an advanced 
industrialized country. It opened up a discussion within and beyond the World Bank over 
the efficacy of multiple “recipes” of economic development (Rodrik 2007) —contrary to 
adhering to the only model, backed by a set of binding principles of neoliberal economic 
development. The event also marked a critical juncture for the Japanese state: it was a 
clear demarcation from its old path driven by the short-term domestic economic interests 
into a new one that manifested Japan’s assertiveness in the multilateral aid sphere.    
Below, I will revisit the questions posed by this dissertation in the introductory chapter, 
namely (1) why did the Japanese state choose to oppose American ideological hegemony 
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in the 1990s? (2) how did the ideas involved in this challenge develop within and beyond 
the institution of Japanese policy bureaucracy? 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS 
 Why did the Japanese state choose to oppose American ideological hegemony in 
the 1990s? I have concluded that there were two principal causes for Japan’s challenge to 
American ideological hegemony in the late 20th century. The first was the shift of 
Japan’s foreign aid strategy in the late 1980s, namely Japan’s decision to transform its 
foreign aid into a vehicle for promoting a particular “model” of export-oriented 
industrialization based on Japan’s development experience. The second one was the 
escalating influence of the Washington Consensus and its interference with Japanese aid 
policy.           
 In Chapter Two, I analyzed the first causal factor—the shift of Japan’s foreign aid 
strategy— and its underlying historical contexts. I investigated what possible domestic 
and international developments (economic, political and institutional) drove Japan’s shift 
in foreign aid strategy in the late 1980s from one led by the short-term interests of 
Japanese businesses into one that had more strategic and policy-oriented goals. More 
specifically, I identified three factors that motivated this shift. The First was the rapidly 
shifting domestic and global economic realities facing Japan and its industries in the 
1980s which forced the government to invest more economic resources into Asia in the 
form of foreign aid. This resulted in a dramatic increase of yen loans to the region. This 
was significant at an early stage of the shift due to the fact that it laid the foundation for 
the state’s political interests to emerge. Second, the gradual shift of institutional power 
dynamics within domestic bureaucracies of foreign aid, particularly the decline of the 
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MITI and rise of the MOF and MOFA drove the state’s foreign aid discourse and strategy 
to shift from one dominated by business interests into one that encouraged the state’s 
international legitimacy building through the medium of foreign aid. Thirdly, Japan’s 
increasing political interests in elevating its influence and status within the multilateral 
development organizations prompted the state to take its autonomous action. It 
constructed and disseminated a Japanese version of the East Asian development model 
that would globally valorize and legitimize Japan’s development experience, which was 
directly at odds with one promoted by the Washington Consensus. Overall, I concluded 
that a mixture of economic, political and institutional factors together drove the Japanese 
government to shift its aid strategy.         
 Meanwhile, the Japanese government’s decision to shift foreign aid strategy alone 
could not have triggered the challenge; without the rise of the Washington Consensus, the 
Japanese state most likely, would never have had to construct an alternative model of 
development. The vigorous promotion of the neoliberal model of development by 
Washington-based international financial institutions and the U.S.’s active involvement 
in them, made it clear to the Japanese state that constructing its own model of 
development and promoting it through multilateral development organizations, 
particularly the World Bank, was the most effective means of state legitimacy building. A 
turning point for the Japanese state came when a senior official in the World Bank began 
directly criticizing the efficacy of Japan’s development policy (namely the two-step loan 
program implemented by the OECF in the Philippines) and suggested it to be terminated. 
In this context, Japan had to strike back by molding its own version of the East Asian 
model in order to disseminate it to the outside world. Japan’s challenge to American 
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ideological hegemony occurred in an environment in which the neoliberal developmental 
ideology of the World Bank clashed with Japanese ideas of “guided markets,” which 
emphasized the role of the state in facilitating a nation’s economic development at an 
early stage. The clash of economic ideologies was the key element in the challenge. 
 The Second question of how the ideas involved in this challenge developed within 
and beyond the institution of Japanese policy bureaucracy was primarily addressed in 
Chapter Three. This chapter highlighted transnational institutional processes in which the 
ideas of the East Asian model were constructed. Despite the fact that many of the ideas 
involved in the challenge were often interpreted by the Japanese policy bureaucracy to 
have unique domestic roots—which were often represented as culturally distinctive and 
incompatible with Western culture—they were, in reality, an outcome of global 
construction. For example, in order to justify their version of the miracle story, key 
Japanese scholars and policy bureaucrats who had played an essential role in the 
construction of the Japanese version of the East Asian model, drew not only on the ideas 
of Japanese economists, but also on the ideas of foreign economists, particularly postwar 
development economists from the West. These key players also shared extensive 
economic training abroad, largely in several influential economic departments in the U.S. 
and the U.K.  These findings also point to the important roles that “hybrid economic 
knowledge embracers/producers” (see Chapter 3) play in the state’s construction of 
development policy models.  
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IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
 What broader implications could we draw from this study?  First, development 
policy models are not just rational instruments to achieve economic means, but they can 
serve as statements of national identity and foreign policy. The East Asian model 
represented Japan’s national identity and was constructed through Japanese interpretation 
of its postwar economic history77 and the East Asian economic miracle. In addition, the 
model was a clear manifestation of Japan’s foreign policy stance toward Asia and 
developing countries. It also demonstrated Japan’s particular economic and political 
positions and social values that were antagonistic to the ones promoted by Washington. 
Secondly, this study confirms that development policy models are social constructions 
created in transnational conversations with other development models. Japan’s 
construction of the East Asian model took place in response to the distinct interpretation 
of the East Asia’s development history constructed and promoted by the World Bank. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three, had the World Bank and the OECF not exchanged 
various interpretations of the economic history of East Asia, the final version of the East 
Asian model would not have emerged. The East Asian model was the outcome of 
transnational exchanges of development ideas that took place in transnational 
organizational spaces of multilateral aid policy making. Thirdly, the study highlights how 
the rise of the Washington Consensus and its explicit menu of policy prescriptions 
diffused by international financial institutions created fertile ground for contending 
development models. For example, for most of Japan’s history, its foreign aid program 
was largely used to promote the pragmatic interests of Japanese businesses. However, 
                                               
77 EPA’s 50th year anniversary publication (EPA 1996:24) clearly states that one of the primary impacts of 
Japan’s history of high economic growth was that it provided an alternative development model for nations 
around the world especially for Asian countries.    
 
 
 
89 
with the rise of the Washington Consensus, Japanese policy bureaucrats began to 
contemplate the possibility of producing a particular development model in order to 
promote a distinct interpretation of East Asia’s economic history that also accommodated 
Japan’s economic, political and institutional interests. Furthermore, the Washington 
Consensus not only affected development countries’ choices of development 
prescriptions, but also donors’ choices. For the first time in history, donor states had to 
choose between endorsing the policy prescriptions of the Washington Consensus and 
creating ones of their own.         
 The story of Japan’s challenge to the Washington Consensus in the late 20th 
century has important implications for more recent developments, such as the rise of the 
so-called “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004). The Beijing Consensus, also, often called as 
“China Model” can be broadly characterized as an alternative approach to development 
that questions the key principles of the Washington Consensus such as privatization and 
free-trade. The China model demonstrates flexible and pragmatic orientations for tackling 
the country’s long-term economic development and thus rejects uniform solutions. It 
strongly posits the role of government to bring about socio-economic change (Ramo 
2004; Osnos 2010). Despite the fact that there is much debate over the definition and 
utility of the China model, observers of the Beijing Consensus agree that its rising 
ideological, economic and geopolitical influence outside of China, particularly in other 
developing countries demonstrates its significance (Ramo 2004:3; Ferchen 2013:411; 
Beeson and Li 2015:105-108). There are a number of similarities between the Chinese 
model and the East Asian model of development (Ferchen 2013:399-400; Shimomura 
and Ping 2013).         
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 What can the Japanese story tell us about the Beijing Consensus? The Japanese 
story suggests that Beijing’s model likely represents not only a set of economic policy 
prescriptions, but also Chinese national identity and its foreign policy—a social 
construction that demonstrates the Chinese state’s own reading of its economic miracle 
story. Second, it suggests that for researchers to understand the Chinese model more 
comprehensively, it is essential to examine its context, particularly the international and 
domestic environments that have been driving the construction of the model. It is likely 
that multiple factors such as economic and political motives along with particular 
institutional developments within the Chinese state, could be promoting the state’s 
construction of its development model. Researchers also might explore the extent to 
which China’s construction of its alternative development model could signal a turning 
point for the Chinese state. It could be an indication that the Chinese state has begun to 
construct its international legitimacy at a new level by going beyond its old practice of 
foreign aid—for example, by playing a leading role in the recent launching of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Researchers should also examine how much the 
prescriptions and economic ideology of the Chinese model will accommodate a mixture 
of economic ideas generated in transnational conversations of development models in the 
global aid sphere.          
 A great example of this is the influential role played by Justin Yifu Lin, a 
Chicago-trained, mainland Chinese economist who had served as the Chief Economist 
and Senior Vice President of the World Bank from 2008 to 2012. Lin is an expert on the 
Chinese Miracle and the author of 18 books and more than 100 articles. Interestingly, Lin 
openly expresses his critical views toward the prescriptions of the Washington Consensus 
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and is a strong advocate of East-Asian style, state-driven industrialization. He questions 
cookie cutter approaches to development and thus rejects the use of terms such as the 
“China model” or “Beijing Consensus” (Osnos 2010; IMF 2012; Beeson and Li 
2015:107; World Bank “Justin Yifu Lin”). Importantly, Lin’s publications, presentations 
and interviews clearly reveal that his thinking has been greatly influenced by exchanges 
of international economic ideas such as neoclassical economics, structural economics, 
development economics and theories of East Asian late industrialization78. Lin represents 
one of the most influential academics in China, and his ideological influence over the 
Chinese state’s economic policy making, as well as the development of the China model 
is unquestionable79. He is a clear example of a “hybrid economic knowledge producer.”   
 Finally, the Chinese example also seems to suggest that although the legitimacy 
of the neoliberal prescriptions of the Washington Consensus have visibly declined within 
the multilateral aid sphere since the late 1990s, it continues to exert control by 
stimulating emerging powers to articulate and elaborate their own development models. 
In this sense, it is likely that the ideology of neoliberal economic development has 
continued to prevail in transnational conversations of economic development and 
probably will do for decades to come.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
78 See (Lin 2012). Key commentators/contributors to this book include renowned experts in the East Asian 
style of industrialization such as Joseph E. Stiglitz and Alice Amsden. 
79 See (Wang 2014). 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 Table 4 demonstrates the tying status of Japanese official development assistance 
(ODA) between 1974 and 1991. It shows Japanese aid’s gradual shift toward untying 
since the mid-1970s. Table 5 shows that by the early 1990s, Japan had one of the highest 
percentages of untying, even in comparison to other major DAC countries. According to 
the information derived from the MITI (1991:35; 1994:30), by the year 1989, 80.5 % of 
yen loans were untied and the rest of the yen loans was LDC (Less Developed Countries) 
-untied. By 1992, 95.8% of yen loans were untied. Additionally, all the funds in the 
Japanese government’s “recycling package” between the late 1980s and early 1990s were 
also untied (Yanagihara and Emig 1991:64). Regarding Japan’s multilateral aid (i.e., 
Japan’s aid disbursed through multilateral development organizations such as the World 
Bank and the ADB), they are generally untied. Table 6 demonstrates what proportion of 
projects financed by yen loans were won by Japanese companies between 1986 and 1992. 
It shows the gradual decline in procurement by Japanese companies.   
 
 
Table 4: Untying of Japanese ODA, 1974-1991 (In Percent) 
 
 
 
Source: The author combined several sources, Yanagihara and Emig (1991) and MITI's "Keizaikyoryoku 
no Genjo to Mondaiten" from various years in order to make this table. These publications cited DAC 
Annual Reports as their source.           
 
 
1974 1977 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1991
Condition of Procurement
Untied 34 44 52 53 64 70 75 66 72 73 78 80
Partially-Tied (LDC-Untied) 6 20 18 16 15 16 12 16 17 14 4 7
Tied 60 36 30 31 21 14 13 18 11 13 18 13
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Table 5: Tying Status of Bilateral ODA by DAC countries in 1991(In Percentage) 
 
Source: Table I-1-3-9① from (MITI 1994:30). Translated and reformatted by the author    
 
Table 6: Procurement Source for Yen Loans (In Percentage) 
 
Source: Table I-1-3-9② from (MITI 1994:31). Translated and reformatted by the author 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Japan U.S. France Germany U.K. Canada DAC average
Tied 13 19 52 54 72 36 34
Partially-Tied 7 12 4 0 0 23 8
Untied 80 69 45 46 28 42 59
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Japan 67 55 43 38 27 31 35
OECD Countries Excluding Japan 9 10 16 21 21 21 13
Developing Countries 24 35 40 41 52 48 52
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 I chose the OECF over other bureaucracies because a number of publications 
suggest that the OECF played a critical role in constructing the ideological challenge of 
the Washington Consensus being Japan’s main liaison to the World Bank’s loan 
operations (Wade 1996; Gyoten 1997; Terry 2002; Akiyama et al. 2003:129). I 
understand that focusing primarily on the OECF does not exclude important ideas and 
policy discourses from other key foreign aid bureaucracies. It is because the Japanese 
state’s institutional practices, such as the constant meetings between the OECF and its 
four supervising bureaucracies (the MOF, the MITI, the EPA and the MOFA) 
accompanied by a wide-spread system of temporary dispatching and exchanging 
personnel from bureaucracy to bureaucracy, seem to have helped ensure that each 
associated bureaucracy’s interests were reflected in OECF’s policy making in some 
ways80. Moreover, I felt that focusing on OECF’s publications have given me a particular 
research advantage. After reviewing documents published by other key bureaucracies 
such as the MOF, the MITI and the MOFA, I came to a conclusion that compared with 
these main bureaucracies, the OECF seemed to have enjoyed a certain freedom in 
expressing bureaucrats’ honest opinions regarding various development-related issues 
because of its “semi-government” (tokushu ho-jin) status. I believe that OECF’s unique 
status, despite being under the direct umbrella of these four ministries, gave the 
                                               
80 Generally a large number of dispatched personnel from other bureaucracies worked within the OECF. 
One OECF official reported at a Diet meeting in 1991 that approximately 70-80 personnel (out of 
approximately 300 OECF staff) were temporarily dispatched personnel from other bureaucracies and the 
private sector 
 (See http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/123/1110/12304211110006a.html).     
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institution a greater room for self-expression without worrying about the Japanese state’s 
“tatemae81” toward the outside world.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
81 Honne and Tatemae are Japanese phrases that contrast one’s true feelings (Honne) and what one 
expresses in public because of the public’s expectations of oneself (Tatemae). For example, here the 
Japanese state’s Tatemae is how the state is expected by society (and the international community) to act or 
express according to its position and circumstances. Most of the time, Honne to Tatemae are different; thus, 
the Japanese state most probably hides what it really believes or desires (which is Honne) in public.    
